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RETHINKING FERES
Andrew F. Popper*
“In sum, neither the three original Feres reasons nor the post hoc rationalization of ‘military
discipline’ justifies our failure to apply the FTCA as written. Feres was wrongly decided and
heartily deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.”
Dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens 1
“You’re old enough to kill but not for voting. . . This whole crazy world is just too frustratin’….”
P.F. Sloan, “Eve of Destruction” 2
I INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1946, sovereign immunity provided an almost complete bar to civil tort actions
against the federal government. 3 While almost all individuals and institutions of every type,
shape, and size were subject to tort claims that held out the potential to make victims whole and

1

* Andrew F. Popper is the Bronfman Distinguished Professor of Law at American University,
Washington College of Law. This article is in part premised on the author’s experience with the
Marine Corps, and, after his honorable discharge, his subsequent service to the United States
government.
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (EDNY), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.
1984)).
2 Lyrics: P.F. Sloan, Eve of Destruction, Dunhill Records (1965) (This article is not about

drafting 18-year-olds in the 1960s “old enough to kill” but not 21, the voting age. However, that
one who serves is denied rights accorded all others (not in the military) is the topic of this piece.)
3 United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846) (“[T]he [federal] government is not liable

to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law.”).
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deter others from similar misconduct, the federal government positioned itself safely, 4 immune
and unaccountable, 5 behind the ancient premise that the “king can do no wrong.” 6 The injustice
this inflicted needs no documentation; while a premise of this article is that the core of our
government is now and has always been essential, representative, and supportive of our best and
most important goals, an institution with millions of employees and with the variety, mass, and
depth of our government is bound to harbor a small number of individuals, institutions, and
entities who act outside conventional notions of due care and fairness. 7

4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (“[I]t is

inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.”).
5 Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial

Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2003) (“‘[S]overeign immunity’ has
never been a complete immunity . . . for the government; it has never barred all remedies for
governmental wrongs. . . .”).
6 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 8 (M. Howe ed., 1963) (“[T]he rule

remains. . . . The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit
the meaning which it has received."); W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 548–69
(5th ed. 1942)( the rationale of sovereign immunity is based on the belief in the divinity of the
King; to allow such suits would contradict perfection).
7 Early efforts to address the need for governmental accountability were documented in a famous

series of law review articles by Professor Edwin Borchard covering municipal and governmental
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In 1946, the ancient wall of sovereign immunity gave way with the passage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 8 By allowing individuals to pursue claims against the United States
for negligence, the FTCA opened the courthouse doors for a limited number of those allegedly
harmed by the misconduct of individuals and entities acting on behalf or under the imprimatur of
the United States government. 9 Although liability was limited from the outset by the vast, vague,
and vexing discretionary function exception (DFE), 10 in limited circumstances the federal

immunity, an international perspective on public liability, and more. See Edwin M. Borchard,
Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928) (focused on
liability for wrongful acts including wrongful confinement); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, VII, 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1924) (criticizing the immunity of government and dismissing the
historical roots: “The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that we consider ourselves bound by
the fetters of a medieval doctrine. . . .”).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671–80 (2018) (originally enacted as

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (amended 2006)).
9 Paul Figley, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT, SECOND EDITION (American Bar

Association 2018) (explaining content of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), discussing the
central substantive issues, and setting out the process for pursing an FTCA claim).
10 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680(a) (2018); Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th

Cir. 2009) (“At the pleading stage, plaintiffs must invoke the court’s jurisdiction by alleging a
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government, like those it governs, could now be accountable for acts of misconduct, negligence,
malpractice, and similar claims in the forum created in the Constitution for resolution of such
grievances, Article III courts. 11

claim that is facially outside of the discretionary function exception.”); (internal citations
omitted) Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(“Our Court’s decision in this case means that the discretionary function exception has
swallowed, digested and excreted the liability-creating sections of the [FTCA]. It decimates the
Act.”); Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1997) (“If the discretionary
function exception applies to the challenged governmental conduct, the United States retains its
sovereign immunity, and the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit.”);
William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court’s Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 56 (1993) (“[T]he
discretionary function exception is not susceptible to ready formulae and precise tests.”);
Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
57 GEO. L.J. 81, 82 (1968) (characterizing the Discretionary Function Exception (DFE) as
“vague and ambiguous”); Mark C. Niles, Nothing But Mischief: The Federal Tort Claims Act
and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 1275, 1334 (2002) (the
discretionary function exception has become a “veritable reassertion of [the] discarded
limitation” of sovereign immunity); Cornelius J. Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for Review and
Revision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. REV. 391, 415–18 (1973) (suggesting
changes to the DFE).
11 U.S. CONST. ART. III § 1.
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Beyond the DFE, the FTCA had explicit limits 12 including (but not limited to) a ban on
punitive damages, limitations on the right to a jury trial, caps on attorney’s fees, an exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement, a bar for claims for injuries sustained abroad, and a bar on
claims for injuries sustained in combat or armed conflict. 13 These exceptions, particularly those
related to injuries sustained in combat or armed conflict, were not controversial then, are not
controversial now, and are not the subject of this article. Unresolved, however, was the fate of
members of our armed forces and their families injured by actors and actions incident to military
service outside of armed conflict or combat.
Within four years of the passage of the FTCA, the Supreme Court, faced with legislation
that did not resolve the fate of those injured incident to military service, decided Feres v. United

12 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C., §§ 1346(b), 2671 (2018); David W. Fuller, Intentional

Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375 (2011);
Paul Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL
INSUR. PRACT. L.J. 1105 (2009).
13 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671–80 (2006). The statute was enacted

as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812,
which was codified and later mended in non-sequential sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006). See Major
Jeffrey B. Garber, The (Too) Long Arm of Tort Law: Expanding the Federal Tort Claims Act's
Combatant Activities Immunity Exception to Fit the New Reality of Contractors on the
Battlefield, 2016 ARMY L. 12 (2016)

6

States, 14 and in broad strokes placed dramatic limits on the civil litigation rights of millions of
Americans were serving or have served in our armed forces. 15 The Court rationalized these
limitations on, inter alia, the need to maintain order and discipline, chain-of-command, military
tradition, uniformity, avoidance of unjust enrichment, military preparedness, and efficiency. The
force of this decision was apparent immediately: most of those injured incident to military
service would be denied access to the very system of justice they pledged to defend. 16 The
limitations in Feres did not affect the complex and comprehensive intra-military benefits

14 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
15 Joseph J. Dawson, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of "Incident to

Service,” 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 485, 498 (1982).
16 See Earl Nicole Melvani, The Fourteenth Exception: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly

Bars Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 396 (2010);
Christopher G. Froelich, Closing the Equitable Loophole: Assessing the Supreme Court’s Next
Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 699 (2005).

7

compensation system 17 and the expansive military health care program. 18 Likewise, Feres had
no effect on intra-military sanctions for wrongdoing or failure to comply with lawful orders,
rules, regulation, practices, and standards governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice 19
(UCMJ). Affected instead was the legal capacity of the vast majority of service members
harmed by wrongdoing to seek civil damages in Article III courts for their injuries. Also
affected (or more accurately, lost) was the potent deterrent effect of civil tort sanctions and the
corresponding accountability those sanctions generate. One premise of this paper is that the
frequency of some of the wrongs (e.g., sexual assault, rape, and clear or gross malpractice) has

17 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. WARRIOR CARE, WOUNDED, III, AND/OR INJURED COMPENSATION AND

BENEFITS HANDBOOK (Apr. 2018),
http://warriorcare.dodlive.mil/files/2018/05/DoD_Compensation-Benefits-Handbook_Apr2018.pdf (setting out the array of benefits available through an intra-service compensation claims
system described by the Department of Defense as “[p]roactively supporting wounded, ill, and/or
injured Service members in their recovery and reintegration or transition to civilian life”).
18 Military Health Sys., About the Military Health System, Health.Mil,

https://www.health.mil/About-MHS (last acessed Jan. 17, 2019).
19 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2018).
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increased to epidemic levels 20 because of the absence of the accountability, of deterrence, that
would otherwise flow from civil tort actions. 21
This limitation on the rights of those who protect and defend our country and way of life,
our soldiers and sailors, Marines and Air Force members, Coast Guard members, reservists, and
even their families – has persisted for 68 years. Misconduct that changes forever the lives of so
many of our fellow citizen soldiers was and is undeterred by civil tort sanction. A vast array of
actions ordinarily addressed and resolved in Article III courts for citizens in the private sector go
unpunished and undeterred when the victim (or in some instances only the perpetrator) is a
service member and the misconduct is, broadly defined, “incident to service.” 22
It is understandable that those who run the risk of sanction would oppose changing a
system that immunizes their misconduct. The desire to be free from sanction is not irrational –
but it is unacceptable. That said, there is no easy path to change. A robust and responsive
military is essential to our peaceful survival. A change that undermines discipline, chain-of-

20 Idrees Ali, U.S. Military Sexual Assaults Down as Reports Reach Record High, REUTERS

(May 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-sexualassault/u-s-militarysexual-assaults-down-as-reports-reach-record-high-idUSKBN17X2CF (last visited Jan. 17,
2019); Mission: Ending the Epidemic of Military Rape, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS,
https://www.protectourdefenders.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
21 Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALBANY L. REV. 181 (2012).
22 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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command, existing compensation systems, 23 sanctions under the UCMJ, and efficient operation
of our defense establishment is dangerous and irrational. Yet in our democracy, power,
efficiency, and the fear of change cannot be the basis for the deprivation of justice and access to
the courts.
On enlistment, service members agree to be bound by a separate set of rules and accept a
system bounded by discipline and unquestioning compliance with lawful orders. 24 Members of
the armed forces take an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . .” 25 Every service member understands the
solemnity of that promise. The oath includes an implicit recognition that defense of our country
may entail engagement in combat, in armed conflict, where the gravest of injuries are a

23 Nearly a thousand pages long, the “Military Compensation Background Papers” present an

impressive array of benefits designed for service members ranging from combat related harms to
toxic exposure to life insurance. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMPENSATION BACKGROUND
PAPER: COMPENSATION ELEMENTS AND RELATED MANPOWER COST ITEMS THEIR PURPOSES AND
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUNDS (8th ed. July 2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdffiles/Military_Comp-2018.pdf/. This compilation of “background papers” covers Persian Gulf
War injuries, all current benefits for traumatic injury treatment and recovery, rehabilitation
options after injury, compensation for incapacitation, death benefits generally, special
compensation for parachute injuries, and more. See id.
24 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946.
25 Oath of Enlistment, 10 U.S.C. § 502.
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possibility for all and an inevitability for some. That oath, that understanding, does not include
the concession that service members would be without recourse should they be injured by
egregious and impermissible misconduct that advance no policy or goal of our armed forces.
Over time, as courts struggled with the term “incident to service” and more and more
claims were barred, rather than protecting discipline and chain-of-command, Feres has ended up
shielding a vast array of deeply troubling tortious misconduct. 26 More than a half century ago,
the late Chief Justice Warren stated that “citizens in uniform” should not be stripped of their
basic rights simply because they are members of the armed forces, 27 and yet, to date, Feres is
the law of the land.

26 Samantha Kubek, Over 70,000 Military Sexual Assaults Took Place Last Year -- Congress

Must Take Action, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/over-70000military-sexual-assaults-took-place-last-year-congress-must-take-action (last visited Jan. 17,
2019); Earl Nicole Melvani, The Fourteenth Exception: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly
Bars Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 396 (2010);
Froelich, supra note 16, at 699; Tara Wilke, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Federal
Sovereign Immunity, the Feres Doctrine, and the Denial of Claims Brought by Military Mothers
and their Children for Injuries Sustained Pre-Birth, 263 WIS. L. REV. 263, 276 (2016); David E.
Seidelson, The Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight Into an Old
Problem, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1983); Captain Robert L. Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine after
Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (1976); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962).
27 Warren, supra note 26, at 188.
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In 2013, the Ninth Circuit lamented that “unless and until Congress or the Supreme Court
. . . ‘confine[s] the unfairness and irrationality . . . Feres has bred,’ we are bound by controlling
precedent.” 28 Recently, the Ninth Circuit again explored an “incident to service” tort claim in a
case involving clear malpractice and found: “regretfully . . . reach[ed] the conclusion that [these]
claims are barred by the Feres doctrine….” 29 As noted by the Tenth Circuit, regret is a
common judicial theme regarding the continued force of Feres as a bar to legitimate clams:
“Suffice it to say that when a court is forced to apply the Feres doctrine, it frequently does so
with a degree of regret." 30

28 Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.

Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703).
29 Daniel v. United States, 889 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2018).
30 Ortiz v. U.S. ex rel. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 822 (10th Cir. 2015).
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In recent years, those who serve in our armed forces have been thanked for their service
by presidents 31 and lauded at the start of nationally broadcast sporting events. 32 Service
members are routinely called heroes 33 – and they are. It is the highest public calling. Yet these

31, President Thanks Military Personnel and Families For Serving Our Country, PRESS RELEASE,

WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Dec. 7, 2004), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041207-2.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2019);
Marisa Schultz, Trump Delivers Thanksgiving Message [sic] America’s Military, N.Y. POST
(Nov. 22, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/11/22/trump-delivers-thanksgiving-message-americasmilitary/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019); Tanya Somanader, President Obama Thanks America’s
Troops and Marks a Milestone in the Afghanistan War, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA (Dec. 15, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/12/15/presidentobama-thanks-americas-troops-and-marks-milestone-afghanistan-war) (last visited Jan. 17,
2019).
32 NFL Honors Veterans and Military Members with “Salute to Service,” NATIONAL FOOTBALL

LEAGUE COMMUNICATION (2016), https://nflcommunications.com/Pages/NFL-Honors-Veteransand-Military-Members-with-Salute-To-Service.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2019); Associated
Press, NFL Honoring Military Service with November Campaign, MILITARY TIMES (Nov. 4,
2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-sports/2018/11/04/nfl-honoringmilitary-service-with-november-campaign/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
33 The “hire heroes” online employment site in a good example of this HIRE HEROES USA,

https://www.hireheroesusa.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
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gestures seem at best incomplete when accompanied by a deprivation of one of the basic rights
due to all citizens.
The position taken in this article is that the FTCA did not preordain Feres. The Feres
Court was not completing a task Congress started. It was legislating. Professor Jonathan Turley,
who studied the Feres doctrine in depth, concluded as follows: “The Feres doctrine stands as one
of the most extreme examples of judicial activism in the history of the Supreme Court. . . . The
Court's sweeping assumptions about the necessity of immunity have produced significant costs
for service members and society at large.” 34
The costs to which Professor Turley refers are not subtle: Egregious misconduct has been
neither sanctioned nor deterred, victims of unquestionably wrongful acts have not been made
whole, and serious harms have not been redressed. Those most entitled to it, those willing to
fight and die for it, have not experienced the great promise of our legal system: fair and open
hearings, an adversary system founded on a level playing field – in short, the blessings of simple
justice. 35
The wrongs inflicted and discussed in this article – sexual assault, rape, clear or gross
malpractice, physical torment that meets the definition of torture – require action. Feres must be

34 Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immunity

in the Military System of Governance, 71 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 89 (2003).
35 The term “simple justice” is less a reference to Richard Klugar’s magnificent text on Brown v.

Board of Education, than to the basic right of every person subject to the laws of the United
States government. See, e.g., Richard Klugar, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
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undone. However, there is a flip-side that makes this far more complex than a simple
recommendation to overturn Feres. The immunity Feres provides has allowed for the efficient
and disciplined operation of our armed forces. 36 Regard for the chain-of-command has meant
that lawful orders are followed, even those orders that, of necessity, can and do result in a risk of
great harm. Advanced training, pushing service members to their physical and psychological
limits, has gone forward without interference from civil courts. Moreover, military justice,
through the implementation of statutes, rules, and regulations of all manner, and through the
remarkable system of intra-military process governed by the UCMJ, has evolved. Outstanding
law students and lawyers committed both to being the best in the profession and to serving their
country have sought positions in the various Judge Advocate Generals Corps in the different
branches of the armed forces. 37

36 Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899, 907

(2010) (whether elected or not, civil court judges in civil courts should not be reviewing policy
choices affecting military the chain-of-command or other discretionary decisions).
37 Julie L. Massing, The Making of a JAG Attorney: Where the Law and the Military Meet, FED.

L. 24 (Mar. 2017), http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-LawyerMagazine/2017/March/Features/The-Making-of-a-JAG-Attorney-Where-the-Law-and-theMilitary-Meet.aspx?FT=.pdf; Alison Monahan, JAG Corps: Military Lawyer, BALANCE
CAREERS (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/want-to-be-a-military-lawyerlearn-about-jag-4039991(last visited Jan. 17, 2019); Ilana Kowarski, 5 Traits for Would-Be
Military Lawyers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 11, 2016),
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The challenge of this article is that the same immunity that shields wrongdoers, leaving
unaccountable individuals and institutions within the government, has also played a role in the
evolution of our unquestionably extraordinary and exceptional armed forces. These are potent
competing forces. Against this backdrop, it is time to rethink Feres.
This article discusses Feres v. United States, 38 the FTCA, the expansion of the “incident
to service” prohibition, the case law and literature in the field, and makes the following
recommendation: Feres should be overturned and the FTCA amended to allow access to justice
in Article III courts for those injured by actions that are neither incident nor essential to military
service. These actions include sexual assault, rape, vicious and unjustified physical violence,
gross or reckless medical malpractice, repetitive incidents of driving under the influence of
narcotics or alcohol, nonconsenting and unknowing exposure to deathly substances, and
invidious discrimination.

II. Feres v. United States
In the four years after the adoption of the FTCA and before the Feres decision, the
Supreme Court decided several cases involving civil tort liability for service members. In

https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2016-1111/5-traits-law-students-can-develop-to-be-a-military-attorney (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
38 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Jefferson v. United States, 39 decided two years before Feres, the plaintiff, an active-duty service
member, underwent abdominal surgery. Eight months after discharge and during a subsequent
surgery, a towel marked “Medical Department U.S. Army” was found in his stomach. 40
Plaintiff filed an FTCA malpractice claim but the case was dismissed based on a finding that the
FTCA did not cover harms suffered in the course of military service. 41 While the Jefferson
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Brooks v. United States, 42 a case involving a
deadly accident between a government vehicle driven by an off-duty service member and a car
carrying a father (a service member) and his two sons. The father was on leave at the time. 43
One service member died in the accident and others were severely injured. The surviving service
member sued under the FTCA, prevailed at trial, lost on appeal, but ultimately prevailed in the
Supreme Court. 44
While the government argued that grave disruption of order and discipline would result if
service members had access to Article III courts, the Court found the accident had nothing to do
with military service and if the claim were barred, it would prevent innocent victims from being

39 Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948).
40 Id. at 709.
41 Id. at 712.
42 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
43

Id.

44

Id. at 50–51.
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compensated. 45 This finding was predicated on the Court’s view that the language of the FTCA
did not exclude all claims by service members, particularly those not incident to service. 46 The
Court also found that resolution of the fate of claims “incident to service” would have to wait for
a “wholly different case.” 47 That different case was presented the following year in Feres v.
United States.
A. Feres v. United States
Feres v. United States consolidated three conflicting federal circuit court cases 48 and held
that the FTCA barred the vast majority of service members from pursuing civil actions in tort in
any Article III court for injuries incident to military service. 49
Feres involved an active duty service member who died in a barracks fire. 50 An FTCA
wrongful death action alleged that the fire was the result of the government’s negligence in
failing to maintain reasonably safe housing for troops. The question on which the Court focused,
however, was not fire safety but rather whether the suit could go forward at all. Did the FTCA

45

Id. at 51.

46 Id. at 49.
47 Id. at 52.
48 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 3

(10th Cir. 1949); Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
49 Id. at 159 (“[T]he Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to

servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to the service.”).
50

Id. at 137.
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allow civil actions against the federal government in cases where an injury was in some way – in
almost any way – incident to service? Despite the lack of clarity in the text 51 or in the legislative
history, 52 the Court determined that in the cases before it, the FTCA waiver of immunity was not
applicable to the alleged injuries (and thus the claims were barred) since each was somehow
incident to service. 53 The opinion did not terminate the right to pursue a civil judgement in all
such cases and left room for review of FTCA claims on a case-by-case basis. 54 However, the
stage was set for what was to follow. From Feres forward, the fate of service members injured
incident to service was, in the vast majority of cases, sealed. 55

51 Id. at 156 (“These considerations, it is said, should persuade us to cast upon Congress, as

author of the confusion, the task of qualifying and clarifying its language if the liability here
asserted should prove so depleting of the public treasury as the Government fears.”).
52 Id. at 155 (describing the lack of “guiding materials” and highlighting that if the Court

misinterprets the Act, “at least Congress possesses a ready remedy”).
53 John Astley, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues to

Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185 (1988) (“An analysis of the FTCA legislative history does not
clearly indicate whether Congress intended to exclude military personnel from FTCA protection
. . . it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended service members to be covered.”).
54 David E. Seidelson, The Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight Into an

Old Problem, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 631 (1983).
55 Nicole Melvani, Comment, The Fourteenth Exception: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly

Bars Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 428–
29

19

While the Feres court made clear that the purpose of the FTCA was to hold the United
States accountable in Article III courts for certain types of tortious misconduct, 56 it found there
was no basis in the FTCA to extend that right to members of the armed forces injured incident to
their service. 57 The Court emphasized that the relationship between those in the armed forces
and the federal government is “distinctively federal in nature” 58 and that such harms were
covered or compensable through other venues. 59 The Court reasoned that if Congress had
intended to provide access to Article III courts 60 for intra-military civil tort claims, it would have

(2010); Kenneth R. Wiltberger, Note, The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability
Act of 2009: An Opportunity to Overturn the Feres Doctrine As It Applies to Military Medical
Malpractice, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 473, 497–98 (2010); Turley, supra note 34, at 10.
56 340 U.S. at 141.
57 Id. (“[P]laintiffs can point to no liability of a ‘private individual’ even remotely analogous to

that which they are asserting against the United States.”).
58 Id. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)).
59 Id. at 144 (“This Court . . . cannot escape attributing some bearing upon it to enactments by

Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or
death of those in armed services.”).
60

Members of Congress have, on occasion, tried to undo Feres but have been unable to garner

the votes needed. Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 111th Cong. 7 (2009); The Feres
Doctrine; An Examination of This Military Exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002),
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done so explicitly. 61 Prior to Feres, in the event the internal systems within the military failed,
service members could seek direct assistance from a member of Congress who could advocate
for a “private bill” that, if passed, redressed their grievances. 62 The lack of overwhelming
numbers of such private bills (and the cumbersome and seemingly arbitrary nature of such relief)
between 1946 and 1950 suggested to the Court that the intra-military compensation system was
not just workable but should be the only mechanism for redress of grievances, not Article III
courts and not private bills. 63

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg88833/pdf/CHRG-107shrg88833.pdf; Melissa

Feldmeier, At War with the Feres Doctrine: The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical
Accountability Act of 2009, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 145, 153 (2010) (discussing legislation that
could modify the harsh impact of Feres); Wiltberger, supra note 55 at 497–98; Jennifer L.
Carpenter, Comment, Military Medical Malpractice: Adopt the Discretionary Function
Exception as an Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 35, 59–60 (2003).
61 340 U.S. at 144.
62 James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and

Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1863, 1877–82
(2010).
63 340 U.S. at 139.

21

Dicta in Feres reasoned that were intra-military civil tort claims common, it would be
problematic at many levels. 64 However, the opinion is driven by a more basic set of issues – tort
liability, the Court suggested, could undermine essential discipline and respect for and
compliance with the chain-of-command, and would be a “radical departure” from established
practices. 65
B. Evolution

of the Feres Doctrine

The prohibition against civil tort actions applicable to active duty (and even-postdischarge) service members in Feres 66 initially co-existed with the marginally permissive
interpretations of the FTCA. 67 In United States v. Brown, 68 decided four years after Feres, a

64 Id. at 143 (concerns even included choice of law/conflict of laws problems: “That the

geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his tort claim makes no sense.”).
65 Id. at 146.
66 Id. at 144 (noting that Congress was aware that it was barring common law tort claims

incident to service: “[T]here was no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to permit
recovery for injuries incident to military service.”); Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889, 891
(9th Cir. 1981) (that Congress has not taken action to address the Court’s “incident to service”
interpretation of the FTCA supports the view that Congress is disinclined to change the incident
to service bar to civil tort claims); Rhodes, supra note 26, at 24.
67 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
68

348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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discharged veteran underwent knee surgery at the Veterans Administration Hospital 69 and
sustained permanent harm to his leg. While the original injury was “incident to service,” 70 the
negligence (medical malpractice) occurred after he had been discharged and would, the Court
found, be “cognizable under local law, if the defendant were a private party.” 71 The Court held
that the claim should be allowed, suggesting that if an Article III court would be available to a
civilian, it should also be available to post-discharged service members.
At that juncture, access to Article III courts became unpredictable, dependent on a series
of factors including when and where the negligent act occurred, the duty status of the plaintiff,
whether the service member was performing a military activity as opposed to taking advantage
of a privilege or enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service, and whether the
service member was subject to military discipline or control at the time of the injury. 72 While all
important factors, no one was dispositive, and each could be viewed in light of the totality of the
circumstances of a given case. 73

69

Id. at 110.

70

Id. at 112.

71 Id. at 111, 113.
72

Paul Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT

TRIAL INSUR. PRACT. LAW J. 1105, 1116–17 (2009).
73

Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Thirty-six years after Feres, these factors were reduced to a list in Dreier v. United
States: 74 “(1) the place where the negligent act occurred; (2) the duty status of the plaintiff when
the negligent act occurred; (3) the benefits accruing to the plaintiff because of his status as a
service member; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities at the time the negligent act
occurred.” 75 Dreier suggested that parties should be given the chance to make an assessment of
“whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions, . . . and whether
the suit might impair essential military discipline,” as well as, “the type of claims that, if
generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of
military discipline and effectiveness.” 76 No matter what factors a court applies, 77 the decision

74 Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1996)( a widow was not barred from recovering

against the United States after her husband was fatally injured when he fell into a negligentlymaintained wastewater drainage following an afternoon of drinking while off duty).
75 Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d

1092, 1094 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1436–41 (9th Cir.
1983)); Jennifer Zyznar, Feres Doctrine: “Don’t Let This Be It. Fight!,” 46 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 607, 623–24 (2013) (assessing the factors that may or may not lead to access to Article III
courts).
76

Dreier, 106 F.3d at 853 (internal quotations omitted).

77 Professor Paul Figley suggests the following test: “whether the injury arose while a service

member was on active duty; whether the injury arose on a military situs; whether the injury arose
during a military activity; whether the service member was taking advantage of a privilege or
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regarding whether an injury is incident to military service 78 resulted in “considerable confusion
among the circuits.” 79
C. Expansive Application of “Incident to Service”
Following Feres and Brown, courts continued to broaden the definition of “incident to
service,” 80 applying the prohibition to medical malpractice, exposure to toxic substances,

enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service when the injury arose; and whether the
injury arose while the service member was subject to military discipline or control.” Paul Figley,
Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL INSUR.
PRACT. LAW J. 1105, 1116 (2009).
78

Kelly L. Dill, The Feres Bar: The Right Ruling for the Wrong Reason, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV.

71, 78 (2001).
79

Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[I]t is difficult to know precisely

what the [Feres] doctrine means today. . . [it is] an extremely confused and confusing area of
law"); Jennifer Zyznar, Feres Doctrine: “Don’t Let This Be It. Fight!, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
607, 614 (2013) (quoting Anne R. Riley, United States v. Johnson: Expansion of the Feres
Doctrine to Include Service Members’ FTCA Suits Against Civilian Government Employees, 42
VAND. L. REV. 233, 244 (1989).
80

See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (barring a wrongful death action even

though the harm was caused by the Federal Aviation Administration, a civilian agency, in large
part because the decedent was a service member); See also Potts v. United States, 723 F.2d 20
(6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (denying recovery to a Navy corpsman for injuries sustained after
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murders or suicides, sexual assaults, and more – hardly activity that could or should be
considered incident to or an essential part of military service. 81 A brief look at those harms
follows.

being struck by a cable while on leave). See, e.g., Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641, 644–45
(6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (barring an action for recover from injuries sustained in an on-base
motor vehicle accident,, which occurred due to an intoxicated, noncommissioned officer). The
court stated that in years prior, “the Court ha[d] embarked on a course dedicated to broadening
the Feres doctrine to encompass, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that
are even remotely related to the individual's status as a member of the military.” Id.
81 The courts have also extended the doctrine to apply to cadets at military academies. See

Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217, 218 (7th Cir. 1981) (barring a cadet from bringing a
medical malpractice claim for vision loss experienced while at the academy). See e.g. Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297-98, 305 (1983) (barring a claim based on racial discrimination);
Doe v. Hageneck, 870 F.3d 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2017) (barring a sexual assault claim); Futrell v.
United States 859 F.3d 403, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2017) (barring a claim for the military’s failure to
pay a retired member’s salary and insurance for a year); Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 645-49
(5th Cir. 2012) (barring a claim based on a hostile work environment in which a superior hung a
noose around a grenade in his office with the number one on it and additionally, would tell the
air reserve technicians to take a number to wait for the “complaint department”); Wetherill v.
Geren, 616 F.3d 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2010) (barring a claim by a dual-status National Guard
member). But see Jackson v. Tate, 648 F.3d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing a discharged
serviceman to bring a claim against a recruiter who forged the serviceman’s signature on re-
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(i) Post-Feres Medical Malpractice Cases
In Henninger v. United States, decided in 1973, the Ninth Circuit barred a medical
malpractice claim involving negligent acts that resulted in the atrophy of the Navy serviceman’s
left testicle. 82 The malpractice began during a physical exam, one of the final steps that was to
lead to plaintiff’s discharge. When a “double hernia” 83 was found (generally referred to as a
bilateral inguinal hernia), the plaintiff asked to have the condition treated in a non-military
hospital after he became a civilian. The military doctor refused to sign the release authorizing
civilian care and performed the operation, resulting in irreparable harm. The court found that
these circumstances fit the definition of “incident to military service,” barred recovery, and
rationalized the decision based on the mandate in Feres and the availability of veteran’s
compensation benefits. 84 Just how this decision enhances military discipline or forwards any
rational interest other than avoidance of accountability and limiting public exposure of
wrongdoing is a mystery that would need to be resolved outside this particular judicial opinion.

enlistment papers); Kelly Dill, The Feres Bar: The Right Ruling for the Wrong Reason, 24
CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 78 (2001). Courts have even incorporated non-combat torts, reckless or
knowing acts, and cases of alleged cover-up into what constitutes circumstances that are
“incident to service.” John W. Hamilton, Contamination at U.S. Military Bases: Profiles and
Responses, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 223, 242-43 (2016).
82 See Henninger v. United States, 472 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1973).
83 Id. at 815.
84 Id. at 815-16.
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That said, varying interpretations of the DFE in medical malpractice claims have
allowed some cases to go forward in highly limited circumstances. 85 When courts assess such
claims based on Feres, the “incident to military service” 86 bar was and is almost
insurmountable. However, courts that moved beyond Feres have found that the DFE was
created to “shield the government from liability for the exercise of governmental discretion, not
to shield the government from claims of garden-variety medical malpractice.” 87 That is not to
say that victims of military medical malpractice have ready or predictable access to Article III
courts under the FTCA; 88 it is the case that many health care cases involve discretionary

85 Carpenter, supra note 60 at 50–52.
86 Id. (citing Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1992)) (declining to apply Feres to

a claim for a child with cerebral palsy even though the negligent prenatal care that caused the
injury was given to an active duty servicewoman); West v. United States, 729 F.2d 1120 (7th
Cir. 1984) (declining to bar liability for the wrongful death of one twin and the birth defects of
another). But see Del Rio v. United States, 833 F.2d 282 (11th Cir. 1987) (deciding a
servicewoman’s injuries received during negligent prenatal care were incident to service); Scales
v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Feres to a suit brought by the parents of
a boy who was born with mental and physical delays resulting from a rubella vaccination during
his servicewoman-mother’s pregnancy).
87 Sigman v. United States, 208 F.3d 760, 770 (9th Cir. 2000).
88 Patricia Kime, Tragedy and Injustice: The Heartbreaking Truth About Military Medical

Malpractice, MILITARY TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-
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judgements (and thus are off limits due to the DFE) – but this does not bar all medical
malpractice cases. 89
In Jackson v. United States, 90 decided in 1997, a reservist at a weekend drill lacerated his
hand. The military doctor treating Jackson did not inform him of the need to have surgery
promptly 91 resulting in permanent damage to his hand. Again, when examining the application
of Feres, the Ninth Circuit found that “the development of the doctrine . . . has broadened to such

benefits/military-benefits/health-care/2016/07/10/tragedy-and-injustice-the-heartbreaking-truthabout-military-medical-malpractice/ (statement of Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs. Dr. Jonathan Woodson).
89 Feldmeier, supra note 60 at 176–77 (citing Collazo v. United States, 850 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.

1988)) (“[W]here only professional, nongovernmental discretion is at issue, the ‘discretionary
function’ exception does not apply.”). See also Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241–42
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the United States is not immune from claims related to the “actual
administration of medical care by its employees,” but is immune from claims related to
discretionary policy decisions involving the allocation of medical personnel and resources);
Martinez v. Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 729 (Nev. 2007) (applying Nevada's FTCA-like waiver
of sovereign immunity and finding that “while a physician's diagnostic and treatment decisions
involve judgment and choice, thus satisfying the [Gaubert] test's first criterion, those decisions
generally do not include policy considerations, as required by the test's second criterion”).
90

110 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1997).

91

Id. at 1486.
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an extent that practically any suit that implicates the military judgments and decisions runs the
risk of colliding with Feres.” 92 The view of the expansiveness of the incident to service
exception has not changed over the last two decades. In Daniel v. United States, 93 decided in
2018, a Navy nurse died after delivery of her child due to postpartum hemorrhaging. 94 The
Ninth Circuit dismissed the claims of medical malpractice and wrongful death based on Feres. 95
The concern expressed in Jackson, that any suit “that implicates” the military is barred, is
even more troubling when it is extended to claims of civilian children of service members. In
Mondelli v. United States, 96 the child of a service member was born with retinal blastoma, a
genetically transferred form of cancer. 97 The cause of the child’s condition was linked to a
genetic anomaly that was a consequence of her father’s exposure to radiation during nuclear
device testing. The Third Circuit lamented that barring the claim would be an injustice—

92

Id. at 1486–87 (emphasis added).

93 889 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2018).
94 Id. at 980.
95 Id. at 980, 982 (citing Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 203, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1987))

(relying on application of the Feres doctrine to bar the claimof a pregnant United States Army
Specialist who had been sent home from the hospital multiple times before being diagnosed with
preeclampsia and delivering a stillborn child).
96 711 F. 2d 567 (3rd Cir. 1983).
97 Id.
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punishing a child for the harm the parents had sustained—but barred the claim nonetheless
because her harm arose from the initial injury to her father that was incident to his service. 98
The courts have, however, allowed recovery on behalf of a child injured in utero in some
cases. In United States v. Brown, a doctor’s negligent action in the course of routine treatment of
a pregnancy allegedly resulted in the child being born with spina bifida. 99 The Sixth Circuit
held that the Feres doctrine did not apply in such a situation because the FTCA, “does not
preclude recovery for negligent prenatal injuries to the child of a military service person that are
independent of any injury to the child’s parent.” 100
However, in Ritchie v. United States, 101 a claim similar to Brown, a mother was ordered
to continue military training while pregnant contrary to the admonitions of the mother’s
physician. 102 Stresses in training led to a premature birth and subsequent death of her infant. 103

98 Mondelli, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983). But see, Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223, 224-

26 (4th Cir. 1992) (allowing recovery for a child born with cerebral palsy because of the
mother’s untreated incompetent cervix, reasoning that the treatment would have guaranteed the
health of the child—a civilian—and therefore cannot be governed by Feres).
99 See Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2006).
100 Id. at 615.
101 733 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013).
102

Id. at 873, 878 (allowing a child in utero to recover, but not the mother).

103 Id. at 873.
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In a wrongful death action for the loss of the child, the Ninth Circuit held that the “in utero”
exception did not apply in this instance because the mother had suffered the injury to her child
incident to service. 104
(ii). Murder and Suicide
Civil tort actions following a murder or suicide have also been barred under the
expansive interpretation of “incident to service” in Feres. 105 In United States v. Shearer, a
service member was kidnapped and killed another while away from his base. 106 Previously, the
assailant had been convicted of an unrelated manslaughter in Germany, 107 a fact know to the
assailant’s superiors who, nonetheless, allowed him to stay on the base. 108 The deceased’s
parents alleged the Army had been negligent by failing to remove or identify the assailant,
leading to the death of their son. Based on Feres, the Supreme Court barred the claim even
though the murder occurred off the base on the premise that allowing the case to go forward
would affect military discipline. 109

104 Id. at 878.
105 Feres, supra note 22 at 135.
106 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1984).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 53.
109 Id. at 58.
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Feres was made applicable to suicide in Purcell v. United States, 110 a case involving the
death of a twenty-one-year-old sailor. Although a phone call beforehand expressed concern that
the sailor had a gun and planned on killing himself, Prucell’s superiors took no action and the
sailor subsequently took his life. 111 The Seventh Circuit explained that even though the family
had not received any benefits related to the suicide and thus would not recover twice 112 (dual
recovery is a common concern expressed in Feres cases), the court barred recovery, seemingly
across the board, in cases involving homicide or suicide. 113

110 656 F.3d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 2011).
111 Id. at 465.
112 See id. at 467. See also, Ritchie, 733 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Persons v. United

States, 925 F.2d 292, 295-97 (9th Cir. 1991)) (holding that the family of a man who committed
suicide as an off-duty member of the military, after the naval hospital released him, could not
recover under the FTCA due to the Feres bar).
113 See also, Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 864–65, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

the family of a sailor who drowned during a Navy-led recreational rafting trip cannot recover
under the FTCA because the totality of the circumstances test determined that certain unrelated
military activities fall under Feres).
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(iii). Sexual Assault and Other Egregious Misconduct
Sexual assault, currently at epidemic levels, 114 and violent hazing 115 have been deemed
incident to service much like murder and suicide. 116 Accordingly, any deterrent effect the tort
system would produce to lessen similar misconduct is lost. In Klay v. Panetta, the plaintiff had
argued that “being victimized by a sexual assault cannot possibly be considered to be an

114 Mission: Ending the Epidemic of Military Rape, Protect Our Defenders,
https://www.protectourdefenders.com/about/; Sexual Assault Reports in U.S. Military Reach

Record High: Pentagon, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/sexual-assault-reports-u-s-military-reach-record-high-pentagon-n753566; Samantha
Kubek, Over 70,000 military sexual assaults took place last year -- Congress must take action,
FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/over-70000-military-sexual-assaultstook-place-last-year-congress-must-take-action.
115 Veloz-Gertrudis v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving a brutal

beating after having been included hung upside down by the ankles until the individual’s bones
separated).
116

See, e.g., Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying the Feres doctrine to bar

plaintiff’s relief sought for a sexual assault that occurred while serving in the military); VelozGertrudis v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a former service
member was barred from bringing a FTCA claim against the government for an incident of
hazing that led to post-traumatic stress disorder).
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‘activity’ incident to military service….” 117 The court rejected plaintiff’s claim, 118 explaining
that the question was not whether being raped is an activity incident to military service, but
rather, the connection to service came from the fact that the assailant was a service member. 119

117

Klay, 758 F.3d at 375 (noting the claim flowed from the defendant’s alleged mismanagement

of the military).
118 Id. at 377 (acknowledging this was a civil rights/Bivens claim, and such claims are simply

unavailable to members of the armed forces). See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(“Bivens suits are never permitted for constitutional violations arising from military service, no
matter how severe the injury or how egregious the rights infringement.”); Erwin Chemerinski,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–22 (5th ed. 2007)). See, e.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
119 Klay, 758 F. 3d at 375-76 (reasoning that because the assailant was a service member subject

to discipline in the military, a civil case focused on the same behavior would interfere with
military judgements).
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The absurdity of the reasoning in Klay needs no elaboration; sexual assault is not incident
to military service. 120 It is a crime, prosecuted, albeit internally, in our armed forces. 121
Prosecution, however, does not equate with justice for a victim. Victims deserve their day in
court. 122 With public focus on this issue by virtue of the “#me too” 123 and “time’s up now” 124
movements, this is the right moment to break free of such preposterous reasoning, particularly in
terms of our armed forces. Our military justifiably takes pride in teaching respect and decency,
insisting on proper decorum, referring to civilians as “Sir” or “Ma’am,” providing a model for

120 Evan R. Seamone & David M. Traskey, Maximizing VA Benefits for Survivors of Military Sexual
Trauma: A Practical Guide for Survivors and Their Advocates, 26.2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343

(2014) (providing a useful guide for those who represent victims of sexual assault in the
military).
121 Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Releases Annual Report on Sexual Assault in Military, DEP’T OF

DEFENSE (May 1, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1508127/dod-releasesannual-report-on-sexual-assault-in-military/.
122 Naomi Himmelfarb et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Female Veterans with Military

and Civilian Sexual Trauma, 19 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS, 837, 838 (2006) (stating that
approximately 23% of females report being sexual assaulted in the military).
123 #ME TOO: YOU ARE NOT ALONE, https://metoomvmt.org/.
124 TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/.
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those within and outside the armed forces. 125 That laudable vision of human interaction is
patently incompatible with a jurisprudence that characterizes sexual assault as incident to
military service. 126
Beyond sexual assault, the FTCA has prevented individuals with traumatic brain injuries,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and complications from chemical exposure from recovering in
Article III tort cases even when such injuries are the result of nonconsenting experimentation,
exposure to toxins, 127 or other actions that bear no meaningful relationship to acceptable
military service. 128

125 Getting the Lowdown on Customs and Courtesies, MILITARY.COM,
https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/getting-the-lowdown-on-customs-and-courtesies.html

(last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
126 Klay, supra 116.
127 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671, 683–84; Veloz-Gertrudis, 768 F. Supp. at 39; Sweet, 687 F.2d

246; Campbell, supra note 2, at 138–40, 152–53.
128 See Helen D. O’Conor, Federal Tort Claims Act is Available for OIF TBI Veterans, Despite

Feres, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 274 (2008). It is estimated that twenty percent (20%)
of troops deployed since 2001 have been affected by traumatic brain injury. Jesse Bogan, Afghan
War Vets, St. Louis Researchers Seek Answers on Head Injuries, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan.
27, 2014), http:// www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/afghan-war-vets-st-louisresearchersseekanswers-on-head/article_daaa0082-4d39-5d0d-899a7e942109c103.html. See Gros v. United
States, 232 Fed. Appx. 417, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (denying recovery to service members who were
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In Baker v. United States, 129 in the course of a training exercise, a military police officer
was injured when the role that officer played was misunderstood by others who, seemingly
without provocation, reacted violently resulting in a life-altering traumatic brain injury. Making
a conventional negligence case based on these facts was a simple matter – and yet, the officer
was unable to recover in tort in an Article III court. 130
A case with more complicated facts, Katta v. United States, 131 demonstrates the force of
Feres in post-traumatic-stress-disorder (PTSD) cases. Ted Katta served in Vietnam in 1969, was

exposed to toxic chemicals in the water on a United States military base); Baker v. United States,
2006 WL 1635634, at *1, 6 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2006) (denying recovery to a military officer who
experienced a traumatic brain injury while participating in a military role playing exercise);
Katta v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1134, 1136–37, 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying recovery to a
mother who alleged that her son received inadequate treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder
subsequent to service); Veloz-Gertrudis v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(denying recovery to a former service member who experienced post-traumatic stress disorder as
a result of a hazing incident); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740,
746, 753–54 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting claims against the United States involving exposure to
Agent Orange in Vietnam).
129 2006 WL 1635634, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2006).
130 Id. at *1, 6.
131 Katta v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1134, 1136–37, 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (appealing a claim

denied by the Veterans’ Administration).
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discharged a year later, and returned home to recover from numerous injuries. After discharge
and during the course of his recovery, he began to show signs of PTSD. The disorder persisted
and intensified, and over time, he threatened family members, was hospitalized by the VA,
released, had episodes of uncontrolled screaming, horrific night terrors, and finally, stepped in
front of a train, taking his life. Katta’s mother sued the VA alleging that the treatment received
for his PTSD was wholly inappropriate. Her claim was rejected based on Feres, on the premise
that PTSD was incident to his service, even though the condition first manifested after Katta
entered civilian life. 132
Like Katta, the fate of Alexis Veloz-Gertrudis is deeply troubling. To say that Seaman
Veloz-Gertrudis was the victim of a hazing incident really does not capture what happened. 133
While assigned to the U.S.S. Forrestal, Veloz-Gertrudis alleged that “[s]enior crewmen tied him
up with rope and suspended him upside down from an air pressure valve. He was stripped to the
waist and grease was smeared over his stomach. Crew members then took turns slapping him on
the stomach and chest.” 134 At one point, “a crew member yanked on the rope by which plaintiff
was hanging, forcing his ankles over the top of the valve. Veloz-Gertrudis heard his ankle "pop"

132 While the outcome in Katta is the norm, there are a few cases, e.g., Wojton v. United States,

199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727, 732–33 (S.D. Ohio 2002) which states that liability is possible for
misdiagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder coupled with the provision of improper
medication.
133 Veloz-Gertrudis v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
134 Id.
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and began screaming with pain. . . .” 135 In response to the screaming, the crew members
“continued to strike him, one delivering a series of particularly hard blows. . . .” When he
threatened to report what had happened, he was punched in the head and neck and, at some point,
a crew member jumped up and down on his back. 136 These events scarred him physically and,
not surprisingly, resulted in PTSD. Yet when he sought recovery for alleged horrific harms he
suffered, he was barred, because, inter alia, “pursuit of plaintiffs' claim would intrude on
military discipline.” 137
It does not take a great leap of logic or a scintilla of disrespect for our armed forces (and
none is intended) to conclude that the circumstances alleged by Veloz-Gertrudis reflect a failure
of military discipline. 138 The very fact that a civil action in tort was unavailable – and thus
undeterred 139 – contributes to an environment where this type of misconduct can take place with
seeming impunity.
The cases of egregious conduct just described would be actionable if the
recommendations in this article are implemented. Even so, many simple negligence and even
certain intentional tort cases (e.g., emotional distress comes to mind) that would be actionable

135 Id.
136 Id. at 39–40.
137 Id. at 41.
138 Id. at 39.
139 See supra, note 13 and accompanying text.
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outside the military would still be blocked and compensation limited to the intra-service
administrative system. An example of what that might look like is Gros v. United States, where
the plaintiff alleged significant harm as a consequence of exposure to contaminated water 140 on
a military base. 141 The Fifth Circuit found that exposure to contaminated water in the plaintiff’s
home (on a military base) was activity “incident to service.” 142 While exposure to contaminated
water was the consequence of a breach of a reasonable duty of care to maintain an essential
service and probably actionable in the private sector, plaintiff’s harm was purely a consequence
of life on a military base and thus genuinely incident to service. Gros would not be actionable
were the recommendations in this article accepted – a simple maintenance failure is not within
one of the seven proposed exceptions to the FTCA.

140 John W. Hamilton, Contamination at U.S. Military Bases: Profiles and Responses, 35 STAN.

ENVTL. L.J. 223, 242-43 (2016) (suggesting removal of the bar on cases for for non-combat torts,
reckless or knowing acts, and cases of alleged cover-up.).
141

See Gros v. United States, 232 Fed. Appx. 417, 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (barring claims brought

against the government by service members who were exposed to toxic chemicals in the water
on a United States military base); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp.
740, 746, 753–54 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying Feres to bar claims against the United States
involving exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam).
142 Gros, 2007 WL 1454486, at *1 (noting that Gros was on active duty when the harm, and as

such “the Feres doctrine bars suit when the injuries ar[i]se on base while plaintiffs were off-duty
and attending to personal activities”).
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Gros is simply different than cases involving rape, violent beatings, clear or gross
malpractice, or nonconsenting exposure to toxins.143 The FTCA was written to allow for
accountability when accountability was essential and would not disrupt the ability of our
government to exercise discretion. It is inconceivable that the discretion Congress had in mind
was the capacity to subject service members to torture, sexual crimes, or toxins.
In United States v. Stanley, 144 the Supreme Court held that the Feres doctrine barred a
claim against the government for long-term effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)
administered to the plaintiff after he consented to participate in a study to test the effectiveness of
protective gear against chemical warfare. 145 The Court found it immaterial that Stanley was
deceived and that he was not acting under direct orders of his superiors in taking the LSD,
invoking chain-of-command concerns. 146 Barring cases where nonconsenting and unknowing

143 See Jonathan D. Moreno, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS 13-52

(2001).
144

483 U.S. 669 (1987).

145

Id. at 671–72.

146

Id. at 680 (stating the officer-subordinate relationship is not crucial under Feres, and noting

that the court, instead, applied an “incident to service” test). See also Sweet v. United States, 528
F. Supp. 1068 (D.S.D. 1981), aff'd, 687 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1982) (barring a former serviceman
from bringing a claim from injuries that arose when that the government forced him to take LSD
as part of an experiment and failed to provide him with the necessary follow-up treatment and
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service members have been used as human subjects for experiments hardly seems to advance
discipline or any other interest used to defend Feres (or central to the DFE) other than avoidance
of accountability. 147
(iv). Avoiding Feres: A Few Exceptions to the Bar
While success rates are low and options few, there are certain instances where Feres may
not apply. For example, the Feres doctrine does not explicitly bar claims for injunctive (as
opposed to monetary) relief, although a cursory look at the case law suggests that it is unlikely
that most courts would issue such injunctions. 148 A second possibility stems from a few cases
involving misconduct by independent contractors retained by the armed forces, 149 where a

care). The court in Sweet noted that the injuries sustained were “inseparably entwined and
directly related to the injury he allegedly sustained while in the service.” Id. at 1070, 1075.
147 See Jonathan D. Moreno, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUM
ANS 13-52

(2001).

148 Compare Speigner v. Alexander, 248 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (holdng that the

doctrine of nonjusticiability extends to cases for injunctive relief, with a few unspecified
exceptions), with Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205 F.3d 504, 512 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding intramilitary suits alleging constitutional violations, but not seeking damages, are justiciable).
149 Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., No. CV 10-02007 DMG (CWx), 2013 WL 655237, at *6

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013), vacated, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff'd in part, 136 S. Ct. 663,
672 (2016) (acknowledging that both sovereign immunity and the government contractor defense
make it difficult to pursue claims against a government contractor, but when on to hold that
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former service member was harmed by actions of the contractor including, in one instance, a
claim based on a post-discharge failure to warn. 150 Service members may also be able to sue
states governments, as opposed to the federal government, although such cases have little or
nothing to do with accountability under the FTCA. 151

"when a contractor violates both federal law and the Government's explicit instruction . . . no
'derivative immunity' shields the contractor from suit by persons adversely affected by the
violation"). See, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510–12 (1988) (neglecting
to directly adopt the Feres doctrine for independent contractors, but holding nonetheless holding
that there could be a significant conflict between federal interests and state tort laws); Lessin v.
Kellogg Brown & Root, 2006 WL 3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (refusing to dismiss
a claim against an independent contractor for negligence in inspecting, maintaining, and
repairing a truck that injured him, causing a traumatic brain injury, while providing a military
escort).
150 Perez v. United States, 2010 WL 11505508, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010) (holding the

Feres doctrine did not bar a claim under the FTCA for negligence in post-discharge failure to
warn about toxic chemicals in the drinking water consumer while stationed that caused nonHodgkin’s lymphoma).
151 Trankel v. Montana, 938 P.2d 614, 619 (Mont. 1997) (holding that a former service member

could bring a claim for negligence related to military service because the claim was against the
state of Montana, and not the U.S. Government).
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In Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force, 152 three service members broke into the office of
Maj. Marsha Lutz and stole documents that disclosed the sexual orientation of Maj. Lutz. 153
Maj. Lutz filed suit alleging that the theft was tortious, designed to harm her reputation, and not
incident to service in any way. The Ninth Circuit agreed, recognizing that, “even Feres
concatenations must come to an end.” 154 The court reasoned that an act by one service member
toward another with “no conceivable military purpose and . . . not perpetrated during the course
of a military activity surely are past the reach of Feres.” 155 The court found that service
members should not be able to avoid responsibility simply because they wore a military uniform
at the time they committed an unquestionably wrongful act. 156 This case is part of a very, very
limited “private acts” exception recognized in Durant v. Neneman: “[O]ur evolving
jurisprudence has created a zone of protection for military actors, immunizing [them from]
civilian courts. It is our conclusion, however, that this zone [created by Feres] was never
intended to protect the personal acts of an individual when those acts in no way implicate the
function or authority of the military. . . .” 157 Durant states the obvious: “When a soldier
commits an act that would, in civilian life, make him liable to another, he should not be allowed

152 944 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1991).
153

Id. At 1470.

154

Id. at 1487 (internal citations omitted).

155

Id.

156

Id.

157 884 F.2d 1350, 1353, 1354 (10th Cir. 1989)
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to escape responsibility . . . because those involved were wearing military uniforms . . .
.[M]ilitary personnel . . . engaged in distinctly nonmilitary acts . . . should be subject to civil
authority.” 158 Of course the problem is that almost all the actions described in this article
involve misconduct which could be seen as incident to service when that term is defined as being
virtually anything in any way related to our armed forces.
In Adams v. United States, 159 the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment dismissing
the claim of the family of a service member who had a fatal heart attack following a
circumcision. 160 That plaintiff had not received payments from the military, was on indefinite
leave, and awaiting separation paperwork to be completed, persuaded the Fifth Circuit to reverse
the summary judgment. 161 Adams suggests that a victim of military medical malpractice may
circumvent Feres when the plaintiff was not returning to military service. 162 Again, while it is
tempting to classify this as an exception, it’s not. For example, almost all PTSD claims involve
veterans who do not intend to return to military service – and almost all are kept out of Article III
courts. 163

158 Id.
159

728 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1984).

160

Id. at 737–38.

161

Id. at 737, 739–40.

162

Adams v. United States, 728 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1984).

163 Amitis Darabnia, To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle: Government's

Response to PTSD, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 453, 480 n. 224 (2016).
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In Hall v. United States, 164 a widow sued the federal government for the wrongful death
of her husband (a petty officer), his two children, and his two step-children, 165 all of whom died
from carbon monoxide poisoning in their home on a naval base after the Navy failed to replace
gas appliances. The government moved to dismiss based on Feres but lost when the court found
that the harm was not incident to the officer’s military service since the officer was off-duty and
asleep, factors prompting the court to consider whether this was personal activity and not
incident to service. 166 This decision does not square with many of the cases already discussed
including Gros v. United States involving harm caused by contaminated water (used for drinking
and bathing) in a home on a base. 167 Frankly, while “personal activity” does seem a legitimate
way to describe behavior not “incident to military service,” there is little to suggest it is a reliable
distinction. 168
(v) Reluctance to Follow Feres

164

130 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Miss. 2000).

165

Id. at 826.

166

Id. at 829.

167 Gros v. United States, 232 Fed. Appx. 417, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (denying recovery to service

members who were exposed to toxic chemicals in the water on a United States military base
168

See Warner v. United States, 720 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that activities such as

shopping might be incident to service if they occur during brief off-duty periods).
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That Feres is problematic is hardly debatable – but is the case an incorrect reading of the
FTCA? Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Johnson , 169 left little doubt of his
point of view; the case, he wrote, is “wrongly decided.” 170 In a dissenting opinion denying a
grant of certiorari, Justice Clarence Thomas observed that the FTCA simply does not mandate
blocking claims across-the-board of service members: “There is no support for this conclusion in
the text of the statute, and it has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen of any
remedy when they are injured by the negligence of the Government or its employees. I tend to
agree with Justice Scalia that ‘Feres was wrongly decided’ . . . .” 171
Assuming Justices Scalia and Thomas are right, the case is nonetheless controlling
precedent, prompting courts to search, often in vain, for exceptions. For example, in Daniel v.
United States, 172 after the court barred the claim based on the Feres doctrine, it stated that the
plaintiff, a dedicated lieutenant, was “ironically professionally trained to render the same type of
care that led to her death. If ever there were a case to carve out an exception to the Feres
doctrine, this is it.” 173 Yet, the current understanding of “incident to service” precluded the

169 United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 700 (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242,

1246 (E.D.N.Y.)).
171 Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 933 (2013).
172 889 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2018).
173 Id at 982.
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Ninth Circuit from allowing an otherwise legitimate claim (from the standpoint of substantive
tort law) to go forward. 174
While Congress did not resolve the matter of tort claims “incident to service,” Feres left
little room for other interpretations: “We conclude that the Government is not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service.” 175 Given the enormity of this declaration, it is worth
exploring whether the justifications on which the Court predicated its opinions are
convincing. 176
III. THE FERES RATIONALES
While the Feres Court found that the FTCA, explicitly, was designed to hold the
government liable, “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like

174 See Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Jennifer Zyznar, Feres

Doctrine: Don’t Let This Be It. Fight!, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 623 n. 125 (2013) (citing
Matraele v. N.J. Dep’t of Military & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2007)
(discussing the Feres doctrines ripeness for reconsideration)).
175 340 U.S. at 146.
176 Tara Wilke, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Federal Sovereign Immunity, the Feres

Doctrine, and the Denial of Claims Brought by Military Mothers and their Children for Injuries
Sustained Pre-Birth, 263 WIS. L. REV. 263, 276 (2016) (quoting 481 U.S. 681, 692–703 (1987)
(Scalia, J. dissenting)).
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circumstances. . .”, 177 the Court also found compelling reasons to bar liability when an injury
was incident to military service. These include the following: (1) “[t]he relationship between the
Government and members of its armed forces is distinctly federal in character,” 178 (2) an
accessible compensation process for illness and injury, and (3) an understandable concern that
the presence of many and varied civil tort claims would undermine discipline, chain-ofcommand, the willingness to follow lawful orders unquestioningly, and more. 179 In addition, the
Court was concerned that expansive civil liability would lead to unequal treatment of service
members. These and other rationales bear scrutiny.
A. Unique Relationship
That there is a unique relationship between members of the armed forces and the federal
government is not debatable. 180 However, it does not follow automatically that the existence of
that relationship must mean denial of access to justice in Article III courts.

177 340 U.S. at 141.
178 Id. at 143.
179

Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977); Feres v. United

States, 340 U.S. 135, 141, 143-44 (1950).
180 See Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV.

393, 434 (2010) (articulating that no private citizen has ever had a relationship comparable to the
power the Government has over its armed forces).
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It has been suggested that evidence of the unsuitability of civil tort litigation to this
unique relationship can be derived from looking at the small number of cases and scant case law
generated between the adoption of the FTCA in 1946 and before the 1950 Feres decision. 181
That there is limited precedent in this time period is in no way surprising or indicative of much
of anything for two reasons: first, the government fought aggressively every case that was
brought, 182 and second, there was no time for the doctrine to evolve and thus no chance to work
through various quirks unique to intra-military litigation. In 1949, in Brooks v. United States, 183
the government argued unsuccessfully that all cases in any way incident to service should be
barred. A year later, in Feres, the argument succeeded, notwithstanding the fact that, as Justice
Thomas later noted, the FTCA says nothing of the kind. 184
If any conclusion is to be drawn from the limited litigation history prior to 1950 and the
almost nonexistent precedent thereafter, it is that in the absence of the potent deterrent effect of

181 Id.
182 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949), Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706

(D. Md. 1948), and the lower court decision in Feres are good examples of this. The
Government’s argument in each of these cases was not that that the Governmental actors
behavior conformed with due care, but rather that the Government was immune.
183 See, e.g., Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
184 Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 933 (2013).
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tort law, 185 there has been an epidemic of sexual assault, 186 significant unchecked acts of
medical malpractice, 187 and impermissible physical abuse. 188 It is no wonder that even

185 Supra, note 114.
186 Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2013) (denying relief sought by a victim of

sexual assault in the military, occurring on the military premise, because civil liability would
affect adversely military discipline); Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 376-77 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(in
affirming the district court’s dismissal, thus rejecting a sexual assault victim’s claims, the court
stated: “[W]e do not take lightly the severity of plaintiffs' suffering or the harm done by sexual assault
and retaliation in our military. But the existence of grievous wrongs does not free the judiciary to
authorize any and all suits that might seem just.”). See Sexual Assault in the Military: Hearing

Before the Subcomm. on Pers. of the S. Comm. On Armed Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement
of Rebekah Havrilla, Former Sergeant, U.S. Army) (sworn congressional testimony setting forth
a harrowing narrative of rape and sexual abuse in the military); Kelsey L. Campbell, Note,
Protecting Our Defenders: The Need to Ensure Due Process for Women in the Military Before
Amending the Selective Service Act, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 115 (2017); Alexandra Lohman,
Silence of the Lambs: Giving Voice to the Problem of Rape And Sexual Assault in the United
States Armed Forces, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 230 (2015); Stella Cernak, Note, Sexual Assault
and Rape in the Military: The Invisible Victims of International Gender Crimes at the Front Line, 22 Mich.
J. Gender & L. 207 n. 9 (2015) (citing Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, Addressing the Epidemic

of Military Sexual Assault, DEMOCRACY NOW (May 9, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2013/5/9/addressing_the_epidemic_of_military_sexual_asault
); Molly O'Toole, Military Sexual Assault Epidemic Continues to Claim Victims as Defense
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judicial conservatives (Justices Scalia and Thomas) took the position that Feres was a mistake
from the outset. 189
The nature of the unique relationship that service members have with the country they
serve is potent, suffused with mandates of command and order, discipline and responsibility, a

Department Fails Females, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/06/military-sexual-assault-defense- department n
1834196.html.
187 Nicole Melvani, The Fourteenth Exception: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly Bars

Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 398 (2010)
(arguing that Feres has rendered service members “second-class citizens, whose rights fall below
even those of the nation's criminals . . . . [The] Feres bar undermines the quality of healthcare
provided to the nation's military forces by preventing accountability for egregious mistakes and
shortcomings in medical treatment.”); Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and
the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 Geo. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 43 (2003) (“Military medical malpractice has long been a subject of intense criticism.
This record may reflect the absence of malpractice as a deterrent in the military medical system
due to the application of the Feres doctrine. While early cases did allow recovery for injuries to
family members of service members, the courts have largely cut off even that element of
deterrence by extending Feres to cover such cases.”).
188 Katta, supra, note 106 at 1136–37, 1141.
189 Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 933 (2013).
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commitment to country, a respect for rules, regulations, statutes, and, of course, the UCMJ. A
lack of accountability for overt wrongdoing is nowhere in that set of critical obligations and
values.
B. Sufficient Alternative Remedies
A second rationale for Feres is the availability of remedies within the system of military
justice. 190 Service members, the Court noted, were “already well-provided for” under the
Veteran’s Benefit Act, a compensation scheme providing funds to those who are injured incident
to military service regardless of fault. 191 The argument is that service members are better off
because (1) there is no obligation to prove fault, (2) any needed medical care is free, and (3)
there are generous insurance, retirement, and other general benefits “outside of the tort area.” 192
Arguably, allowing those with such benefits to recover in an Article III court could be seen as
dual recovery or unjust enrichment and create an “uneven system for compensating troops.” 193
Moreover, the “simple, certain, and uniform” compensation system results in “recoveries [that]

190 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
191 See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1977).
192 Leo Shane III, The Argument for Keeping the Feres Doctrine, STARS AND STRIPES (Apr. 2,

2012); Figley, supra note 211 at 427.
193 Shane III, supra note 173.
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compare extremely favorably with those provided” by other federal compensation schemes, such
as workers’ compensation. 194
Detractors of the current system assert that it is neither sufficient in amount nor reliable
enough to cover the harms service members and their families experience and certainly
insufficient to produce a deterrent to future violations. 195 Particularly in post-discharge

194 Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–45. See Froelich, Closing the Equitable Loophole: Assessing the

Supreme Court’s Next Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable Relief for Military
Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 699, 716 (2005) (emphasizing that the President has exclusive
authority over military rights, duties, responsibilities, regulations and procedures). Circuit courts
have expressed concern that “judicial meddling in such instances would violate the separation of
powers” and further that “civilian courts are inherently unsuitable and incompetent to oversee
such matters. Id. at 728 (citing Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1511 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
195

Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. L. REV.

1, 45–47 (2007) (arguing that the veteran’s compensation system may require litigation, and
further, it is inefficient, slow, not always accurate, and not as generous as the Feres court might
have believed); Helen D. O’Conor, Federal Tort Claims Act is Available for OIF TBI Veterans,
Despite Feres, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 274 (2008) (arguing that the benefits
available through veteran statutes do not adequately cover life-long impairments).
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compensation cases, veterans face significant barriers.196 In fact, there is simply no basis to argue

and no record to support the proposition that the compensation system available within the
military is comparable to the civil justice system in terms of the amount of individual
judgements, deterrent effect, and fairness. The question is whether adding the potential for
access to Article III courts in highly limited and well-defined circumstances would do more harm
than good.
To be sure, mechanisms for discipline, strict adherence to lawful orders, and respect for
the chain-of-command are essential. That those critical components of our armed forces are
undermined by making the government civilly accountable in select cases involving
unquestionably wrongful conduct simply does not ring true and is not justified by an imperfect
administrative and internal system of compensation. 197

196 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DOD HEALTH: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY ARE CONSIDERED IN
MISCONDUCT SEPARATIONS 12 (May 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684608.pdf; Clinic
Files Class Action on Behalf of Marine Corps Vets with PTSD, YALE LAW SCH. (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/clinic-files-class-action-behalf-marine-corps-vets-ptsd
(describing the filing of a class action law suit on behalf of thousands of Navy and Marine Corps
veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan who developed post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental
health conditions during military service but were separated with less-than-honorable discharge).
197 Compensation for Victims of Military Malpractice: Hearing Before the Military Pers. and

Comp. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 100th Cong. 1 (1987) (statement of H.
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The premise of this particular rationale is that an administrative compensation system
within our armed forces (broadly defined) would be frustrated or cannot co-exist when a small
number of victims of overt wrongdoing have access, in limited circumstances, to civil justice in
Article III courts. First, there is literally no empirical evidence to support this justification.
Second, the idea that a victim would be unjustly enriched wrongfully presupposes that courts
would permit a person to be awarded twice for the same costs and that the damages one would
seek and receive in an Article III court are the same one would receive in an administrative
tribunal. Presumably, an administrative award for costs or damages could be off-set against a
judgment for those same costs and damages. Alternatively, it is possible to avoid the unjust
enrichment problem by providing a service member an opt-out option from the military
administrative compensation system to pursue a civil tort claim as is done with intentional torts

Lawrence Garrett III, General Counsel, Department of Defense) ("The Department believes that
amendment of the Military Claims Act . . . may very well provide . . . a solution.").
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in certain workers compensation systems 198 and a number of other administrative compensation
programs. 199
C. Chain-of-Command and Military Discipline

198 Grammatico v. Indus. Comm'n, 90 P.3d 211, 213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (on opting out of

Workers’ Compensation and pursuing remedies in tort, based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23906.A). Several cases provide examples of allowing a worker to opt out of workers’
compensation when they are victims of an intentional tort. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127
P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005); Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838 (Conn. 1997);
Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
501 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1985); VerBouwens v. Hamm Woods Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874 (S.D. 1983);
Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 482 (La. 1981).
199 Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP,

163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1673 (2015) (discussing the Vaccine Act opt-out option found at 42
U.S.C. § 300aa--11(a)(2)(A)(i), 300aa-21(b) pertaining to retention of vaccine claimants
retention of the right to pursue civil tort options). See COMCAST CABLE ARBITRATION OPT OUT
AGREEMENT (2007), http://comcast.com/arbitrationoptout/default.ashx (an opt-out program
where the option was limited funds from settlement versus independent litigation); SEPTEMBER
11TH VICTIM’S COMPENSATION FUND, https://www.vcf.gov/ (creating a fund to pay victims of the
9/11 terrorist disaster in which victims have the option to take the settlement distribution or opt
out and litigate independently).
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Respect for and adherence to rules, discipline, tradition, training/conditioning regimes,
and the chain-of-command is vitally important to the effective and efficient operation of our
armed forces. The limitations in Feres are driven, in meaningful part, by the concern that
exposure to liability would undermine those vital aspects of military life. 200 The argument is
that civil tort litigation, “if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military
affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.” 201 The discipline and the very
nature of the command structure would, “get bogged down in lengthy and possibly frivolous
lawsuits [that may ] substantially disrupt the military mission, by requiring officers … to testify
in court as to their decisions and actions. . . .[taking] scarce resources away from compelling
military needs’ to avoid legal actions.” 202
Notwithstanding the important concerns expressed above, there is no concrete data, no
studies, not even any documented history to support the proposition that providing access to
justice in Article III courts to address egregious misconduct means undoing the UCMJ, rules
related to discipline, training regimens, or, for that matter, any rules and regulations regarding
service members. Nothing in that structure need change.

200 340 U.S. at 146
201 Regan v. Starcraft Marine LLC, 524 F.3d 627, 634.(5th Cir. 2008). See Dawson, supra note

18 at 488 (claiming that the “often maligned military discipline rationale, standing alone, is
sufficient to support the Feres doctrine”).
202 Leo Shane III, The Argument for Keeping the Feres Doctrine, STARS AND STRIPES 216 (Apr.

2, 2012) (referring, inter alia, to comments of the Solicitor General).
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Access to justice means only that there would be a remedy in a court of law for isolated,
undeniably unacceptable misconduct clearly not essential to military operations, order, or
discipline. Undoing Feres is not an invitation for a free-for-all, for chaos, for the end of
tradition, or anything of the sort. Being accountable for discernible wrongdoing does not equate
with the behavioral Armageddon and mayhem Feres devotees fear. The converse seems more
realistic: systemic avoidance of liability for clearly actionable behavior shields wrongdoers,
fosters distrust and resentment, enshrines unequal treatment, and nurtures a culture of secrecy.
On the more pointed question of chain-of-command, in the absence of Feres, would
service members regularly question the judgment of their superiors? If so, the doctrine should
not change. 203 However, there is no demonstrated reason to believe that long-standing military
practices, including unquestioned compliance with all lawful orders, would vanish simply
because a very small number of people who engage in overtly unacceptable misconduct are held
accountable for their actions. Making the recommendation to amend the FTCA and end the
Feres bar is accompanied by the deeply held belief 204 in the essential nature of the kind of
training and discipline that has characterized our military since its very beginning. 205

203

Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 671–72; Feres, 340 U.S. at 141, 143–44.

204 The conclusions in this section draw more heavily on the author’s personal experiences

noted briefly at the outset of the article.
205 This is not a debatable point, but it is one that is discussed regularly. Jon Mixon, USAF

(ret.), Why is the Military So Strict and Tough?, MILITARY1 (2018),
https://www.military1.com/army/article/538486-why-is-the-military-so-strict-and-tough/; Adam
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The discipline/command arguments are not complicated: (1) holding wrongdoers
accountable does not undermine discipline; (2) holding wrongdoers accountable does not cause
the collapse of the chain-of-command or otherwise invite insubordination; (3) findings of civil
liability in tort make it less likely that unlawful, unreasonable, and indefensible risks to human
welfare will take place in the future; 206 (4) if Feres did not bar recovery, the frequency of
isolated controversial or injurious practices might be curtailed; 207 (5) given the exposure and
fiscal potential of tort liability, lifting the Feres bar would make it more likely the federal
government would acknowledge wrongdoing rather than fight tooth and nail the very existence
of responsibility for actions that cause harm; 208 (6) subjecting the federal government to the

Taylor, (coder, ret.), Why Is Discipline Important in a Military?, QUORA (2017),
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-discipline-important-in-a-military.
206 Jonathan D. Moreno, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS (2001)
207 Hinkie v. United States 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983) (barring civil liability in a radiation

exposure case where not only was there service member a victim, but his spouse and child as
well); Jaffee v. United States, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 20332 (3rd Cir. 1980) (blocking service
members’ claims based on Feres despite a commanding officer’s awareness of risk from
exposure to deadly radiation); Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Miss. 2000)
(holding that widow of a petty officer could recover for her husband’s death and death of their
children from carbon monoxide poisoning in their home at a naval base)
208 The federal government fought successfully all claims involving exposure to dioxin (Agent

Orange) in Vietnam, as well as chemicals in the water on military basis, among other claims. See
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light of day for systemic misconduct including invidious discrimination should have a powerful
corrective effect, 209 and (7) when there are no consequences for tortious misconduct, there is no
meaningful deterrence for repetition of that same act. 210
It is simply illogical to assume that discipline and respect for authority are optimized in a
setting where accountability is circumscribed. It is more logical to assume that the presence of
unchecked egregious misconduct advancing no service related goal is the consequence of
insufficient accountability and deterrence.
D. The “Feres is a Fair Interpretation of the FTCA” Rationale
The FTCA, like most statutes, has gaps – but the Court in Feres was not engaged in

Gros, 232 Fed. Appx. 417, 417 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,
597 F. Supp. 740, 746, 753–54 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Kelly L. Dill, The Feres Bar: The Right Ruling
for the Wrong Reason, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 80 (2001) (explaining how courts have barred
claims where exposure to chemicals or radiation has led to birth deformities); see also Molly
Kokesh, Applying the Feres Doctrine to Prenatal Injury Cases After Oriz v. United States, 93
DENVER L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2016) (citing Ortiz v. United States Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., No.
12-CV-01731-PAB-KMT, 2013 WL 5446057, at *7 (D. Colo, Sept. 30, 2013) (discussing the
genesis test for the “in utero” exception)).
209 David Saul Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the

Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 1015-1016 (1986) ([C]ases involving particularly egregious
or widespread military misconduct are more appropriately resolved by civilian courts. . . .”)
210 Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2012).
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judicial “gap filling” of an ambiguous statute. 211 The Court was legislating. It’s one thing for
the Court to give clarity to a statute. It’s quite another to craft a massive exception to liability in
a statute designed to create accountability, blocking countless claims, when the statute on which
those claims would be based, the FTCA, does not do so. 212 The idea that Congress was
unaware of the importance of specifying exceptions to the FTCA when it opened the door to tort
liability is indefensible. Exemptions or exceptions, e.g., the DFE, were discussed, and the matter
of service members considered – e.g., the addition of the word “combatant” 213 in House
debates. A blanket bar of liability would have been a political decision of great moment – but it
did not happen.
When Congress passed the FTCA and waived sovereign immunity, had Congress been
inclined to block the vast majority of civil tort claims emanating from the single largest branch of
government, the Defense Department, 214 it easily could have done so – but it did not. Seen in

211 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
212 John Astley, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues to Grow,

38 AM. U. L. REV. 185 (1988) (“An analysis of the FTCA legislative history does not clearly
indicate whether Congress intended to exclude military personnel from FTCA protection . . . it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended service members to be covered.”).
213 Id.
214 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (last accessed Jan. 17, 2019),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1600/executive-branch (“The Department of Defense is
the largest government agency, with more than 1.3 million men and women on active duty,
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that light, Feres is not just overly broad, 215 it is an incorrect interpretation of the FTCA and thus
wrongly decided. 216
To be fair, there is thoughtful and compelling scholarship defending the Court’s decision
as consistent with the FTCA. 217 There is also the fact that the Court crafted limitations on civil
actions in Feres as the best way to solve what it perceived as the problem of maintaining
discipline and the chain-of-command, both understandable and undeniably valid goals.
Regardless of the motivation when the case was decided, the immunity Feres spawned has

nearly 700,000 civilian personnel, and 1.1 million citizens who serve in the National Guard and
Reserve forces.”).
215

See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2018); Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated

Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 60–72 (2007).
216

Johnson, 481 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

217

Figley, supra note 179, at 443 (explaining Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431

U.S. 666, 671–72 (1977) and reiterating the reasoning behind the Feres doctrine); Feres, 340
U.S. at 143–44 (describing the alternative methods of recovery as one of the rationales behind
the adoption of its nonjusticiability doctrine).
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played a role in the aforementioned epidemic of sexual assault, 218 inexcusable negligence, 219
and more. Quite obviously, these actions have not been deterred – and they are not “incident to
service.” 220 Without a Congressional imperative in the FTCA on service related harms, the
Court, for legitimate reasons, took a shot at setting public policy engaging in the kind of “judicial
law making” often condemned 221 violating one of the most basic notions of separation of

218 Mission: Ending the Epidemic of Military Rape, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS (last accessed

Jan. 17. 2019), https://www.protectourdefenders.com/about/; Sexual Assault Reports in U.S.
Military Reach Record High: Pentagon, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sexual-assault-reports-u-s-military-reach-record-highpentagon-n753566; Samantha Kubek, Over 70,000 military sexual assaults took place last year - Congress must take action, FOX NEWS (NOV. 16, 2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/over-70000-military-sexual-assaults-took-place-last-yearcongress-must-take-action.
219 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671, 683–84 (1987); Veloz-Gertrudis v. United

States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Sweet v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068, 1070
(D.S.D. 1981), aff'd, 687 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1982); Campbell, supra note 2, at 138–40, 152–53.
220

Klay, 924 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D.C.D.C. 2013) (“[B]eing victimized by a sexual assault cannot

possibly be considered to be an ‘activity’ incident to military service.”).
221 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992)

(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is
instructive to compare this Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life tenured [judges] . . . with the
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powers. 222 Over time, Feres has left countless victims without full remediation, wrongdoers
without accountability, and foreseeable injurious misconduct unchecked.

somewhat more modest role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders."); Turley, supra note
34, at 89; Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141, 143 (2002)
("Judicial activism is any occasion where a court intervenes and strikes down a piece of duly
enacted legislation."); REPRESENTATIVE TRENT FRANKS,UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKS DENOUNCES NINTH CIRCUIT RULING AGAINST PARENTAL RIGHTS
(Nov. 4, 2005) http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/az02_franks/110405_ParentalRights.html
("This is just the latest outrage to come from the Ninth Circuit, which has become the poster
child for judicial activism.").
222 Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court - October Terms 2009 Foreword: Conservative Judicial

Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 866-67 (2011) ("Judicial activism is a grave threat to the
rule of law because unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the
Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the
public"); David N. Mayer, The Myth of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 250-51 (2009) ("The basic vice of
judicial activism … is that it violates the fundamental American constitutional principle of
separation of powers. . . .”); Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in
Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 581 (2007) ("[J]udicial activism [is at odds
with basic notions of] separation of powers principles because the Constitution renders such
authority to Congress rather than the federal judiciary. . . .”).
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E. The Unequal Treatment Rationale
Another rationale underlying Feres was the concern that access to Article III courts in
select and unpredictable cases would result in unequal treatment of service members. 223 While
it is important for similarly situated service members to be treated equally and while equal
treatment is the promise of the entire justice system, 224 fear of unequal treatment is just that – a
fear. Again, there is nothing in the Court’s opinion that demonstrates just how access to justice
is discriminatory – because it is not. That an injured person seeks a remedy in a court of law
hardly seems a basis to cry foul.
There is one other aspect to equal treatment. Military justice pursuant to the UCMJ is
remarkably efficient and fair. Yet in any military process of any kind, rank and regard for the
command structure are appropriately of consequence. While rank does not make one above the
law under the UCMJ, rank matters in the way parties are addressed and treated. This is not in
any way a criticism – the system of military justice is a stunning example of how, in a very

223 See Shane III, supra note 173 (arguing that not only would such claims affect the concept of

equality of treatment for all troops in the armed services, but that without imposition of limits,
“the armed forces would get bogged down in lengthy and possibly frivolous lawsuits”).
224 Discussing the possibility of unequal treatment and litigation by prisoners, the Court rejected

the contention outright: “[W]e conclude that the prison system will not be disrupted by the
application of Connecticut law in one case and Indiana law in another to decide whether the
Government should be liable to a prisoner for the negligence of its employees.” United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963).
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unique setting, an enviable quantum of justice can take place. With multiple and potent interests
in play, the system strikes an almost miraculous balance between disciplined efficiency and
fairness. That said, it is simply be untrue to say that this system is no different than that which
takes place in an Article III court.
In civil, non-military courts, rank does not dictate credibility assumptions, respect, or
deference. The judge is not an officer in the same branch of the service as the parties before the
court. 225 There is no convening authority (often a commanding officer) with special authority
to activate the proceeding or review the outcome of a case. Civil courts, by design and tradition,
prize equal justice under law, a level playing field, justice, and compassion. Those notions,
particularly equal justice under law, are the dominant hallmarks of the entire system of
justice. 226 It cannot be that the possibility of a fair and open trial where all stand on equal
footing is to be avoided because it reveals undue advantage and unequal treatment.

225 That cases involving the armed forces can end up in non-military courts is not a novel

concept. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (anticipating cases originating in the
armed forces but finding an exhaustion requirement for such cases); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974) (habeas corpus review of court martial); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972);
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
226 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last accessed Jan. 17,
2019).
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The Feres Court rationalized its decision based on legitimate fears. Over the next 68
years, those fears did not manifest. Instead, the wrongs described in this paper have. Harkening
back to undocumented fears without evidence that they will ever occur is not an acceptable
rationale to justify the deprivation of rights explicit in Feres. 227

IV. ANALOGIES TO OTHER FEDERAL PROGRAMS
To see if Feres was the norm for federal employees, it is worth looking at a few other
federal agency programs. Several large programs involving government employees and others
have somewhat similar limits on access to Article III courts. However, none of those programs
have seen widespread unchecked discrimination or the same levels of sexual assault or multiple

227 Author’s note: Fear of what might happen should not be the basis for denying our service

members so fundamental a set of rights – or any set of rights. For example, we condemn
legislation that constitutes a prior restraint on speech even knowing that some speech may, in the
end, be horrific and injurious, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior
restraints on speech that restrict news and commentaries are inherently unconstitutional). We
cherish the notion of a presumption of innocence in criminal cases even knowing that we run the
risk of acquitting those who have committed crimes. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of
Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329 (1995) (deconstructing innocence and its place in American
jurisprudence). We do so, predicated on our belief in the strength of our system of justice, not on
fear that the system might fail. A fear driven legal system is an open-ended invitation to
totalitarianism.

69

instances of egregious malpractice. Moreover, while limiting injured government employees or
others to administrative relief is not unusual, as it turns out, based on Feres, our service
members, the best among us, get the least protection from tortious misconduct.
A. Federal Employees outside the Armed Forces: FECA
There is a limitation on access to Article III courts for federal employees via the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA). 228 Their claims, more often than not, are pursued
administratively 229 (much like workers compensation claims in the private sector 230). “Federal
employees' injuries that are compensable under FECA cannot be compensated under other
federal remedial statutes, including the Federal Tort Claims Act.” 231
The difficulties federal employees face bringing civil actions in tort based on the
FTCA 232 surfaced in Ezekiel v. Michael. 233 There, a federal employee sued a resident VA

228 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 10, 20 (2018).
229 5 U.S.C. §§ 8103-8193.
230 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION,

https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/workcomp (last accessed Jan. 18, 2019).
231 Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d 947, 951 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Demko,

385 U.S. 149, 151 n.1 (1966)).
232 See generally, Wallace, 669 F.2d 947 (1982).
233 Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1995).
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physician after an injection with a contaminated hypodermic needle. 234 Because the physician
was a federal employee acting in the scope of his employment, the plaintiff’s remedies were
limited to FECA. 235
FECA provides for wage loss compensation, medical care, rehabilitation, attendant’s
allowance, and survivors’ benefits. 236 As with workers compensation and cases barred by
Feres, FECA is, 237 for the most part, an exclusive remedy. 238 In making FECA the sole
remedy, Congress intended to “limit the government’s liability to a low enough level so that all
injured employees c[ould] be paid some reasonable level of compensation for a wide range of
job-related injuries, regardless of fault.” 239 Federal employees have “the right to receive

234 Ezekiel, 66 F.3d at 895.
235 Id.
236 Howard L. Graham, FED. EMPLOYEES COMP. ACT PRAC. GUIDE § 1:1 (2d ed.) (2017).
237 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. U.S., 460 U.S. 190, 193–94 (1983).
238 Williamson v. United States, 862 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Spinelli v. Goss, 446

F.3d 159, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); Elman v. United States, 173 F.3d 486, 492 (3d Cir. 1999);
Votteler v. United States, 904 F.2d 128, 130–31 (2d Cir. 1990); Wilder v. United States, 873
F.2d 285, 288–89 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Vilanova v. United States, 851 F.2d 1, 7 n.24
(1st Cir. 1988); see also Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(proposing that FECA is an exclusive remedy).
239 Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
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immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation from their federal
employer, but in return they lose their right to sue the government.” 240 However, claims of
discrimination by federal employees including sexual harassment, unlike similar claims in the
armed forces, may be heard in an Article III court. 241 In addition, FECA claims can be judicially
reviewed in an Article III courts when there is a (1) cognizable constitutional claim, and (2)
when there is an explicit statutory violation. 242 No such exceptions exist for service members.
b. Federal Inmates
In United States v. Muniz, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
prisoner could recover under the FTCA for injuries sustained while in the prison. 243 While such
claims might affect prison discipline, the Court found the parties presented no evidence that tort

240 Patnaude v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 643, 650 (D. Del. 2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)

(limits the rights of service members as well as civilians doing business with the military to
pursue claims for injuries in Article III courts)).
241 Kristin Sommers Czubkowsk, Comment, Equal Opportunity: Federal Employees' Right to

Sue on Title VII and Tort Claims, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841 (2013).
242 Staacke v. United States Secretary of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1988); Rodrigues v.

Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1985) (for constitutional challenges); and Oestereich v.
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1968); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184, 188-89 (1958) (for claims involving a statutory violation).
243

United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150 (1963).
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recovery would affect discipline. 244 Muniz, however, did not result in anything remotely
resembling regular access to Article III courts. Instead, Congress passed the Inmate Accident
Compensation Act (IACA) 245 establishing an administrative compensation system for federal
inmates or their dependents for work-related injuries occurring during incarceration. 246
Pursuant to IACA, the Federal Prison Industries Board maintains the Prison Industries Fund as
the sole means of compensation for inmates, 247 effectively barring inmates from maintaining an
FTCA suit. 248 In deciding the exclusivity of the IACA, the Supreme Court echoed the
reasoning related to FECA (and Feres): “[W]here there is a compensation statute that reasonably
and fairly covers a particular group of workers, it presumably is the exclusive remedy to protect

244

Muniz, 374 U.S. at 163 (“It is also possible that litigation will damage prison discipline, as the

Government most vigorously argues. However, we have been shown no evidence that these
possibilities have become actualities in the many States allowing suits against jailers, or the
smaller number allowing recovery directly against the States themselves.”); Melvani, supra note
16, at 429–430 (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162-62 (1963)).
245 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (2012).
246 Michael B. Mushlin, 2 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 8:22 (5th ed., 2017).
247 18 U.S.C. § 4126.
248 U.S. v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); see also Campbell, supra at §2[a]; Mushlin, supra note

239, at § 8:22.
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that group.” 249

Parenthetically, the claims of federal prison employees, as opposed to inmates,

were discussed in Wilson v. United States, 250 and found to be outside IACA and limited to the
FECA.
Looking at basic civil rights, members of the armed forces, unlike other federal
employees or even convicted felons, do not have the option to bring a 1983 251 civil rights
action 252 or Bivens claim. 253 Wilson found that prisoners, on the other hand, have those
options: “[T]he statutory scheme lack[s] procedural safeguards for the prisoner’s constitutional
rights, the statute possesse[s] very little deterrent value, and there [is] no explicit indication from
Congress [barring] Bivens action[s].”254 The same statutory deficiencies are applicable to

249 Demko, 385 U.S. at 151–52 (citing Patterson v. U.S., 395 U.S. 495 (1959); Johansen, 343

U.S. 427 (1952)).
250 Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1992).
251 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
252 Koprowski v. Baker, 822 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2016); Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir.

2009); Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997); Scott v. Reno, 902 F. Supp. 1190 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
253 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (involving a civil rights claim against what
was then the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for a violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be
free from unreasonable search).
254 Smith, 561 F.3d at 1102 (citing Bagola, 131 F.3d at 644–45).
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service members – and yet, Dean Irwin Chemerinski’s summation of their civil rights options, or
lack thereof, is telling. Unlike federal employees or prisoners, “Bivens suits are never permitted
for constitutional violations arising from military service, no matter how severe the injury or how
egregious the rights infringement.” 255 This distinction is of consequence when considering the
range of alleged (unchecked and thus undeterred) acts 256 of invidious discrimination. 257

255 Erwin Chemerinski, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–22 (5th ed. 2007).
256 Overt discrimination resulting in disparate treatment, normally within Title VII (42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2 (1982)) does not apply directly to the military. McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). While recent cases, e.g., Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2016), have expanded and clarified the reach of Title VII, applicability to the military via a civil
rights case brought in an Article III court is not part of that change.
257 J. Stephen Clark, But-For Sex: Equal Protection and the Individual Right to Marry a

Specific Person Without Regard to Sex, 60 S.D. L. REV. 389, 398 (2015) (on the history of
discrimination in the military); Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII
Remedy for Discrimination in the Military, 96 Yale L.J. 2082, 2084-86 (1987) (detailing the
history of discrimination); Overview of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at
the Military Service Academies, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the H.
Comm. On Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 64 (2017).
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Finally, unlike service members, an inmate can seek judicial review of an IACA decision
predicated on a violation of procedural safeguards or abuse of discretion. 258
C. Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
The last of the alternate programs assessed is the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA), 259 which provides governmental and non-governmental
employees disability and death compensation for harms sustained on navigable waterways. The
statute originally covered “employees in traditional maritime occupations such as longshore
workers, ship-repairers, shipbuilders or ship-breakers, and harbor construction workers,” but
coverage expanded substantially with the enactment of the Defense Base Act (DBA) 260 which
included those who “work for private employers on U.S. military bases or . . . lands used by the
U.S. for military purposes outside of the United States,” among others. 261 When the LHWCA
258 “[A]n inmate may seek judicial review of a final IACA decision under the Administrative

Procedures Act. . . .” Johnson v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195074 (D. Ore. 2018);
Peguero v. Unicor Indus., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59900, at 5 (D.N.J. 2014) (an inmate can seek
review of an IACA decision based on, “procedural safeguards and assessment for abuse of
discretion . . . .” (citing Thompson v. Federal Prison Industries, 492 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1974))).
259 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (2012).
260 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–54 (2012).
261 DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR, LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/FAQ/lsfaqs.htm.
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applies, it is an exclusive remedy barring civil tort actions in Article III courts pursuant to the
FTCA. 262 However, similar to FECA, if the federal court believes there is a “substantial
question” regarding whether LHWCA applies to the employee’s claim, it will generally hold the
case in abeyance. 263 The LHWCA is similar to FECA in that a “third party . . . subject to
liability for injuries covered under LHWCA may maintain an indemnity action against the
United States. . . .” 264 (something service members cannot do), The LHWCA does not bar
discrimination claims (again, something that is barred for service members), and LHWCA cases
are appealable in federal court (not so for service members). 265
Each of these programs reflects the values and trade-off in what has been called the
“grand bargain” underlying workers compensation: 266 In exchange for foregoing the right to

262 1 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S. § 2:10 (2018) (because LHWCA disputes are between

two private parties, the question of whether LHWCA bars constitutional claims is generally not
at issue).
263 Id. (citing Wilder v. U.S., 873 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1989)). Unless an administrative decision

is made on the applicability of the LHWCA, an employee’s acceptance of a voluntary LHWCA
award is not conclusive in barring the employee’s ability to sue under the FTCA.
264 Id. (citing Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 937 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
265 Warner v. Contract Claims Servs., Inc., 2017 LEXIS 182567 (E.D.N.C. 2017).
266 Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 506 S.W.3d 230 (Ark. 2016); Cross v. Slayter Trucking Cos., 206

So. 3d 1124, 1130-31 (La. App. 2016); Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, 366 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo.
2016); Vasquez v. Dillard's, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 786, (Okla. 2016); Baker v.
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bring a civil action in tort, a person gains access to a more simplified administrative no-fault
system to address the costs of an injury. 267 However, all of the programs, except the military
compensation scheme, allow for discrimination claims in federal court. All of the programs,
except the military compensation scheme, rely on federal courts to determine if the various
compensation programs are applicable. While there are undoubtedly other distinctions, e.g.,
most of these programs exclude intentional torts,268 one thing is clear: while the idea of limiting
access to civil tort actions in certain situations is not unique to the armed forces, the incidence of
unchecked and undeterred misconduct in the military described in this article powerfully suggest
the need for change. In the closed universe of military justice and administrative compensation,
something is amiss. It stands to reason that the Feres bar has played a central role by greatly

Bridgestone/Firestone, 872 N.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Iowa 2015); Whedbee v. N.D. Workforce
Safety & Ins. Fund, 845 N.W.2d 632, 637 (N.D. 2014).
267 Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work Injuries in the

United States, 1900-2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891 (2017); but see Price V. Fishback, LongTerm Trends Related to the Grand Bargain of Workers' Compensation, 69 RUTGERS L. REV.
1185 (2017) (commenting on and disagreeing in part with Emily Speiler’s article).
268 Matthew K. Brown, Note, How Exclusive Is the Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy?

2010 Amendments to Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Statute Shoot Down Parret, 65 OKLA.
L. REV. 75 (2012); see Okla. Stat. § 302 (2011) (access to court is barred "except in the case of
an intentional tort, or where the employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation for
the injured employee...").
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limiting the deterrent impact of civil judgements, allowing gross misconduct to occur without
consequences.

V. THE CURRENT FERES ENVIRONMENT
The Feres doctrine, like the scope of the DFE, 269 has been the topic of endless
discussions and the target of frequent criticism. 270 While there is no general agreement on the

269 Jonathan A.Bruna, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the

Federal Torts Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 412 (2012); Stephen L. Nelson, The King’s
Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: Understanding the Discretionary Function Exemption
to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 259 (2009); Lawrence Kaminski, Comment,
Torts – Application of Discretionary Function Exception of Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 MARQ.
L. REV. 88 (1952) (noting the confusion generated by the discretionary function exception).
270 Jennifer L. Zyznar, Comment, The Feres Doctrine: "Don't Let This Be It. Fight!, 46 J.

MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 626 (2013); Melvani, supra note 16, at 428-29; Kenneth R. Wiltberger,
Note, The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009: An Opportunity to
Overturn the Feres Doctrine As It Applies to Military Medical Malpractice, 8 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 473, 497-98 (2010); Turley, supra note 34, at 10; David Saul Schwartz, Making
Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992,
996-97 (1986); Feldmeier, supra note 49, at 150; Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially
Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2007); Jennifer L. Carpenter, Comment,
Military Medical Malpractice: Adopt the Discretionary Function Exception as an Alternative to
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best next step in a post-Feres legal universe, a real change, and not just juridical side-stepping, is
needed. Isolated examples of “work-arounds” where Feres did not block a claim, e.g., the Agent
Orange decision, 271 or the compensation provided for exposure injuries and open pit burns, 272
are hardly an answer. Most cases end up with limited or no recourse.273 For example, the attempt to
address water toxicity at Camp Lejeune provided for notification and only limited benefits – and then
only to those stationed at the camp.274 There was also a proposal to create a separate compensation

the Feres Doctrine, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 35, 59-60 (2003); Andrew Hyer, Comment, The
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for a Workable
Analysis, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1091, 1109-10; Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual
Harassment in the Military: Time for a Change of Forum? 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 345
(1999).
271 Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11, § 3 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307,

3.309 (2018).
272 Dignified Burial and Other Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-

260, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 2417, 2422 (2013).
273 Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L.

REV. 439 (2005) (reviewing various routes through and around the discretionary function
exception); Courtney W. Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV.
93 (1985) (arguing that too many intra-military actions are barred).
274 See, e.g., S. 277, 112th Cong. (2011) (providing hospital care, medical services, and nursing

home care for any illness acquired by veterans and family members who were stationed at Camp
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system for military victims of sexual assault and harassment. 275 None of these examples,
however, would open the courthouse doors to claims by service members.
The last major legislative proposal, the Carmelo Rodriguez Malpractice and Injustice
Act, 276 was presented to Congress in 2009. 277 The bill 278 sought to amend the FTCA to “allow
claims for damages to be brought against the United States for personal injury or death . . .
arising out of . . . medical, dental, or related [malpractice].” 279 The bill was to honor Sgt.
Carmelo Rodriguez who died after a military doctor misdiagnosed a deadly malignant

Lejeune); Janey Ensminger Act, H.R. 4555, 111th Cong. (2010) (directing the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs to furnish hospital care, medical services, and nursing home care to veterans
who were stationed at Camp Lejeune).
275 Julie Dickerson, A Compensation System for Military Victims of Sexual Assault and

Harassment, 222 MIL. L. REV. 211, 240-59 (2014).
276 Feldmeier, supra note 49 (broad discussion of the Carmelo Rodriguez Military

Accountability Act).
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81

melanoma. 280 Even after hearings 281 which made clear that service members, “would not be
allowed to bring suits ‘arising out of . . . armed conflicts,’” 282 negotiations broke down and the
bill died when differences could not be resolved between those who wanted to enhance the intramilitary compensation system and those seeking to undo Feres. 283
The last time the Supreme Court granted cert in a Feres case where major change seemed
quite possible was United States v. Johnson in 1987. 284 In Johnson, plaintiff died in a rescue
mission while on board a HH-52 Seaguard. 285 The crash was attributed to the negligence of

280

Byron Pitts, Military Can’t Be Sued For Malpractice, CBS NEWS (Mar. 24, 2009, 6:43 PM),
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before the Subcomm. on Comm. and Admin. Law, 111th Cong. 7 (2009).
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United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682 (1987).
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civilian FAA air traffic controllers. 286 The decedent’s estate argued that Feres should not apply
because (1) the FAA is a civilian agency, and (2) the actions leading to the crash were not
incident to service. The Court, however, rejected both arguments 287 and left little room for doubt
regarding Feres: “This Court has never deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar. . . in
the close to 40 years since it was articulated. . . .” 288 Passing the buck somewhat, the Court
noted that Congress has the power to alter the rule if it determines that Feres was a
misinterpretation of the FTCA. 289 As noted earlier in this article, it is in the Johnson dissent
that Justice Scalia and others concluded that “Feres was wrongly decided. . . .” 290 At different
points, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas also imply that the Feres doctrine, at a minimum, deserves

286

Id.

287

See generally id.

288

Id. at 686.

289 Id.
290

Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700–701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Product

Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
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a second look, 291 but despite having a number of opportunities to do so, the Court has left Feres
unchanged. 292
Frustration with the expansive interpretation of “incident to service,” (and without
expressing whether Congress or the Court should act) Professor Richard Custin wrote, “the
ruling should be addressed because it unfairly discriminates against military personnel,
essentially stripping them. . . of a civil right. . . . [B]abies? Birth injuries? That’s not incident to
service. [Malpractice causing] your appendix [to] rupture. . . .That’s not incident to service.” 293
Notwithstanding the concerns and criticisms noted in this article, there remains clear and
understandable opposition to change. Within the ranks, Dr. Jonathan Woodson, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, warned that “chaos” would result if troops were allowed
to sue for injuries. 294 Maj. Gen. John Altenburg, Jr. (Ret.), would instead prefer to improve the

291

Kine, supra note 283.

292

See generally Ortiz v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1431 (2017); Ritchie v. United States, 134

S.Ct. 2135 (Mem.) (2014); Read v. United States, 571 U.S. 1095 (2013); Witt v. United States,
564 U.S. 1037 (2011); and Hafterson v. United States, 558 U.S. 948 (2009).
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current benefits system. 295 In academia, there is also meaningful and solid scholarship 296
supporting Feres including Professor Paul Figley’s eloquent defense of the doctrine (along with
a suggestion of how the doctrine could be clarified). 297 Professor Figley’s analysis is consistent
with the reasoning in Feres and Stencel Aero Engineering. v. United States. 298
Stencel applies Feres to a broad range of claims that could be brought by various third
parties and government contractors against the federal government. It relies on the same
reasoning as Feres: the necessity of preserving the chain-of-command, the unique nature of the
military, and the importance of allowing discretionary and command judgements to remain in the
military and not second-guessed by federal courts. 299 The Feres-Stencel doctrine has also
barred claims initiated by injured service members against third parties and government

295 An up-to-date comprehensive summary of many benefits are available in: MILITARY

COMPENSATION BACKGROUND PAPERS (8th ed. 2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/mil-comp.html.
296 Dawson, supra note 15, at 498.
297 Paul Figley, supra note 179; Joan M. Bernott, Fairness and Feres: A Critique of the
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298 Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977).
299 Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV.

209, 237 (1963) (arguing that courts are not the proper forum to “determine whether complex
government decisions are ‘reasonable.’”).
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contractors, rendering those contractors practically immune from civil tort litigation in fields as
diverse as product liability and medical services. 300
Notwithstanding the stubbornly unchanging position of the Court, in the ranks, and in
some corners of the legal professoriate, the tone of a number of circuit courts is wistful,
unenthusiastic, decrying the unsoundness, harsh impact, or basic unfairness of Feres, while
recognizing the case as binding precedent. 301 Consider Daniel v. United States, 302 a wrongful
death/malpractice case. After childbirth in a military hospital, Lt. Daniel began hemorrhaging.
Those entrusted with her care failed to take the appropriate steps to stop the bleeding and she
died in a few hours. 303 The District Court found it had no option but to dismiss the claim based
on Feres “unless and until Congress or the Supreme Court choose to confine the unfairness and

300 McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983) (Feres-Stencel provides de

facto immunity for tort claims), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
301

See generally Daniel v. United States 889 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2018); Ortiz v. United States,

786 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2015); Read v. United States, 536 Fed. Appx. 470 (5th Cir. 2013);
Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013); Witt v. United States, 379 Fed. Appx. 559
(9th Cir. 2010); Hafterson v. United States, 2008 WL 4826097, No. 3:08-cv-533-J-16MCR
(M.D. Fl. 2008).
302 Daniel, 889 F.3d at 980.
303

Id.
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irrationality that Feres has bred. . . .” 304 The Ninth Circuit agreed, 305 acknowledging that “[i]f
ever there were a case to carve out an exception to the Feres doctrine, this . . . is it,” but noted
that “only the Supreme Court has the tools to do so.” 306 A petition for certiorari is currently
pending. 307
Similarly, in Ortiz v. United States, 308 a malpractice case where errors made during a
caesarian section led to significant deficits in a child, 309 the Tenth Circuit declared that “the facts
. . . exemplify the over breadth (and unfairness) of the doctrine, but Feres is not ours to

304
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overrule.” 310 Quoting Costo v. United States the court, “join[ed] the many panels of this Court
that have criticized the inequitable extension of this doctrine to a range of situations that seem far
removed from the doctrine’s original purposes.” 311
Similar sentiments were voiced in Ritchie v. United States, 312 a wrongful death action
filed after malpractice during pregnancy led to the death of plaintiff’s infant son. 313 The District
Court acknowledged that “a child’s premature birth and subsequent death would be devastating
to any parent,” but dismissed the claim “[b]ecause the Feres doctrine applies. . . .” 314 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed: “In light of Supreme Court and our own precedent, we regretfully conclude that
[Feres bars the claim].” 315[emphasis added]
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In Witt v. United States, 316 surgical malpractice left plaintiff in a permanent vegetative
state. The District Court dismissed, noting that “the alleged facts [were] so egregious and the
liability of the Defendant [seemed] so clear,” the court “did give serious consideration to
Plaintiff’s argument that this Court should allow [the] claim in spite of Feres. . . ” 317 On appeal
the court found it was “bound by precedent of the Supreme Court . . . to affirm the . . .
dismissal.” 318 In Hafterson v. United States, another malpractice/wrongful death case, 319 the
court found that “[d]espite Plaintiffs' well-reasoned opposition to [the] application of the Feres
doctrine, it is clear that this case cannot escape the doctrine's broad reach.” 320
In Colton Read v. United States, a military surgeon sliced into the plaintiff’s aorta in the
course of routine gallbladder surgery. 321 The court held as follows: “Irrespective of criticism of

316
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the Feres doctrine . . .the government remains immune [because] Colton Read’s injuries were
‘incident to service’ and not actionable under the FTCA.” 322
As the above cases suggest, while there are expressions of regret regarding the doctrine,
there is also nearly uniform adherence to Feres. Those who have studied the doctrine, 323 urge
“comprehensive change,” 324 to “permit the adjudication of personal injury and death claims. . .
.” 325 Others urge an “impact on military discipline” test to “define ‘incident to service,’” to

322

Read v. United States, 536 Fed. Appx. 470, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2013).

323

See generally Melvani, supra note 16, at 398 (Feres has rendered service members “second-

class citizens, whose rights fall below even those of the nation's criminals. . . . [The] Feres bar
undermines the quality of healthcare provided to the nation's military forces by preventing
accountability for egregious mistakes and shortcomings in medical treatment.”); Turley, supra
note 34, 43 (“Military medical malpractice has long been a subject of intense criticism. This
record may reflect the absence of malpractice as a deterrent in the military medical system due to
the application of the Feres doctrine.” [footnotes omitted]); Feldmeier, supra note 49; Harold J.
Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (1992).
324

Feldmeier, supra note 49, at 178 (citing Maj. Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially
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“cure the ills of this doctrine and protect the rights of our nation's service members.” 326 If one
assumes there are currently injuries and related claims that are in no way incident to anything
remotely resembling military service (sexual assault and clear or gross malpractice come to
mind), what options exist to provide access to justice in Article III courts? The Court and
Congress unquestionably have the capacity to undo Feres,– but then what?

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
There are, at a minimum, three options:
(1) Leave Feres and the FTCA as is;
(2) By congressional or judicial action, overrule Feres and do nothing further, in which
case, service related civil tort claims against the government would have to be based on the
FTCA, limited unpredictably by the DFE, mimicking the uncertain civil tort environment
between 1946 and 1950;
(3) Overrule Feres, amend the FTCA, and specify those behaviors, events, practices, or
actions that are not incident to or essential for service and therefore potentially actionable. 327

326

Thomas M. Gallagher, Servicemembers’ Rights under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking

Incident to Service Analysis, 33 VIL. L. REV. 175, 202-203 (1988).
327 If this set of options sounds familiar, perhaps it is because they boil down to the same

options facing Congress as it debates healthcare – leave the ACA as is, repeal, or repeal and
replace. Sean Sullivan, Republicans abandon the fight to repeal and replace Obama’s health
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Option three is the best course.
To start, option one is out – as is suggested throughout this article, Feres has run its
course, spawned an epidemic of undeterred misconduct, and left countless thousands of innocent
victims without remedy, without justice, and without their day in court.
Option two is also inadvisable. Were Feres overruled without further clarification, there
would be unpredictable and discordant exposure to tort liability under the FTCA as well as a
continuation of irrational limitations on liability due to the multiple exceptions in the FTCA
including, of course, the expansive DFE. 328 The DFE has expanded beyond any fair
interpretation of the text of the statute and precludes meritorious claims while securing “nothing
of value except perhaps a modest savings in litigation costs.” 329 Without amendments, the

care law, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/republicans-abandon-the-fight-to-repeal-andreplace-obamas-health-care-law/2018/11/07/157d052c-e2d8-11e8-ab2cb31dcd53ca6b_story.html?utm_term=.b32a0712d191; ACA Repeal/Replace,
https://www.afp.org/media-center/kits/aca-repeal-replace.html
328 Id. at 59–60 ((“the [DFE] has more flexibility than the Feres doctrine because the DFE

allows [for] a case-by-case analysis. . . .”).
329 Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 411, 414–15 (2012).
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FTCA alone would leave victims in the Neverland of the DFE, the “broadest and most criticized”
of the thirteen enumerated exceptions to that Act. 330
That more of a change is needed seems obvious – hence, option three. The goal would be
to help courts determine what actions are an essential component of military service (and
therefore not actionable) and those that do not involve an essential component of military service
(and are potentially actionable claims).
While this solution, at least initially, cannot resolve with certainty the question of the
effect of civil liability on military discipline and chain-of-command, it would leave untouched
the existing array of potent sanctions for misconduct, failure to follow lawful orders, or failure to
comply with a host of regulations currently in place. These powerful mechanisms should be
sufficient to prevent the chaos defenders of Feres fear. A limited number of civil tort cases
focused on undeniable misconduct seem unlikely to prompt insubordination or a collapse of
order and discipline. Instead, it is far more likely that overruling Feres and amending the FTCA
will give justice to victims of wrongdoing and deter future misconduct.
On that point, it is fair to wonder whether the incidence of sexual assault, domestic
violence, clear or gross medical malpractice, physical abuse, and similar wrongs would decline
in the presence of the potential for governmental tort liability. Does the potential for money

330 Feldmeier, supra note 49.
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damages in a civil court deter future misconduct if the actors in question do not pay but the
federal government does? 331
First, at a personal level, litigation forces victims and alleged wrongdoers to re-live some
of the worst moments of their lives. Cases of this type are painful and jarring. No one with even
a passing understanding of our legal system would look forward to the essential rigors of civil
litigation. That alone is a deterrent force. Second, a finding of fault in civil courts may have a
real and direct effect on those accused of wrongdoing. It takes no imagination to anticipate that a
finding of liability in an Article III court predicated on a determination of misconduct could
activate an inquiry and may be the opening shot for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings
within the military justice system. Third, at a governmental level, it would be fanciful to assume
there would be no deterrent effect from civil tort litigation. Like any entity anywhere, our
military services will do what they can to make sure they are not hauled into court. There is,
then, much to be gained (and unfortunately much to be deterred) from the imposition of liability.
Whether there will be beneficial consequences from opening the courthouse doors is a
question more easily answered than the extent to which civil liability will affect the command
structure on which the military must depend. The necessity of following lawful orders without
question is vital to all missions our military undertakes. Similarly, unlike many walks of public
and private life, there is a physicality to the military training experience that is both essential and,

331 Figley, supra note 286, at 464 (“if Feres did not exist, the Department of Defense would be no
more responsive to financial deterrence than it is with Feres.”).
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on occasion, painful and harsh. 332 Training is not just athletic conditioning. Troops training for
combat must be pushed to the limits of their endurance, both physically and psychologically. To
create individuals and units that act with a common purpose, a willingness to risk one’s life for
one’s comrades, the starting point is often stripping recruits of practices, habits, and ideas they
bring with them to the service and replacing those beliefs with the values of mission, task,
country, command, service, and more.
The kind of training and service just described involves actions, outside of the military,
that could be seen as tortious but in fact are vitally important. Such actions cannot be the basis
of civil tort liability. 333 Like injuries sustained in combat or armed conflict, these would be
harms sustained in actions not just incident to but essential to military service and for such
harms, there is no place for civilian courts to be reassessing essential military judgements.
Accordingly, the best approach is not an open-ended civil tort universe where any
potentially actionable behavior in the military could become the subject of litigation. Instead,
this recommendation identifies only seven specific behaviors that are actionable. The following

332 Jon Mixon, U.S.A.F. (Ret.), Why is the Military So Strict and Tough? MILITARY1 (2018),
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333 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (“Civilian courts must . . . hesitate long

before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship
between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of
the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.”).
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actions or behaviors should be excluded from the rights limiting regime spawned by the DFE and
Feres:
1.

Sexual assault (is not essential to military service).

2.

Rape (is not essential to military service).

3.

Extreme physical violence or acts that fall within the definition of torture,

domestic violence, and child abuse (are not essential to military service).
4.

Acts of clear or gross medical malpractice (are not essential to military

service). 334
5.

Exposure of service members to pharmaceuticals, narcotics, or toxins without

informed and voluntary consent (is not essential to military service). 335
6.

While in military service, acts of driving under the influence of drugs or narcotics

on more than one occasion (is not essential to military service).
7.

Acts or patterns of invidious discrimination on the basis of race, religion,

ethnicity, or gender (are not essential to military service).

334 There are many definitions of “gross” but the term is used here to connote actions that are,

by clear measure, undeniably malpractice. W. PAGE W. KEETON, ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS

§ 34, at 211, 212 (5th ed. 1984). See e.g., NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958

F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (N.D. Okla. 1997); Kenneth W. Simmons, Rethinking Mental States, 72
B.U.L. REV. 463 (1992) (discussing the many and varied meanings of the term “gross”).
335 Jonathan D. Moreno, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS 13-52 (2001).
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The above actions are as intolerable in military life as in civilian life. Those who have
been victims of such acts should be able to pursue their claims in Article III courts, the system of
justice they pledged to defend. In this model, the UCMJ is unchanged and unaffected. The
approved intense, demanding, painful, and harsh physical and psychological demands of training
are not lessened. Discipline, chain-of-command, tradition, efficiency, following unquestioningly
all lawful orders, all paramount considerations, are not disrupted.
When those who engage in misconduct are held accountable, when government is
obligated to remedy those wrongs, respect for order, discipline, and all standards will increase.
When uniformly condemned actions are subjected to public scrutiny in Article III courts, the
probability of future similar misconduct will decline.
Assuming this recommendation is followed, it would only make sense for Congress to
revisit the impact of the amendment to the FTCA within a few years and assess whether limited
exposure to tort liability impedes, improves, or has no discernible effect on the capacity of our
armed forces to carry out all essential functions. 336 In the meantime, as the courthouse doors
open partially, those who engage in the unquestionable misconduct described throughout this
article will be subject to legal sanctions, and those victimized will finally have their day in court.

336 Attribution: Special thanks to Washington College of Law students Megan Masingill,

Marissa Ditkowsky, Sienna Haslup, Katelyn Davis, and Riley Horan, and the American
Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment for providing support for those students.

